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ABSTRACT—The Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act (FOSTA) has provoked criticism from free-speech advocates, people 
involved in the commercial sex trade, everyday internet users, and scholars 
who deem the Act dangerous and ineffective. This Note helps to explain how 
such a controversial law came to be. Indeed, FOSTA is part of a legacy of 
failed attempts at reforming laws to comport with feminist goals—in this 
case, ending online sex trafficking and providing relief for sex-trafficking 
survivors, a group that consists largely of women and other marginalized 
people. But FOSTA, like its predecessors, fails to provide real relief to its 
intended beneficiaries. Instead, it falls into the trap of punitiveness by 
prioritizing punishing offenders over providing meaningful relief for sex-
trafficking survivors. By shifting the focus away from punitiveness and 
toward actual aid, this Note proposes a solution that helps sex-trafficking 
survivors without endangering free internet speech, consensual sex workers, 
or others currently affected by FOSTA’s speech restrictions. This solution 
accords with both First Amendment doctrine and much of the feminist 
consensus on improving the lives of women, girls, and other marginalized 
communities. 
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“While currently the impact of FOSTA/SESTA is felt most acutely by those 
of us participating in the commercial sex trade, this bill affects everyone—
escorts are just the canaries in the coal mine trying to make our warning call 




After months of public controversy, yet near unanimous congressional 
approval, the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act 
(FOSTA)1 became law on April 11, 2018.2 FOSTA modified existing law in 
 
 † Lucy Khan, Against FOSTA/SESTA: One Canary’s Cry from Inside the Coal Mine, SLIXA BLOG: 
EXPERIENCE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.slixa.com/blog/experience/against-fosta-sesta-one-canarys-cry-
from-inside-the-coal-mine [https://perma.cc/XW89-F5B9] (arguing that FOSTA’s main effect so far has 
been to promote censorship of sexual speech online rather than ending sex trafficking). 
 1 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 
1253 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A & 47 U.S.C § 230). FOSTA also includes key 
provisions of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA). The Act is commonly known both as 
“FOSTA” and “FOSTA–SESTA.” See, e.g., Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking 
Threatens the Future of the Internet as We Know It, VOX (July 2, 2018, 1:08 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom 
[https://perma.cc/6BJC-WFML]. For the sake of brevity, and in accordance with the Act’s Short Title, 
this Note refers to the Act simply as FOSTA.  
 2 FOSTA; see also World Without Exploitation, Effective Lobbying Starts with Listening: How 
Survivor Voices Drove the Fight for Passage of FOSTA-SESTA, MEDIUM (May 3, 2018), 
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two ways to help combat online sex trafficking. First, FOSTA amended 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),3 abrogating previous 
interpretations that construed § 230 as an impervious shield for internet 
service providers, even those who aided sex traffickers.4 Second, FOSTA 
amended the Mann Act, an anti-prostitution and antitrafficking law,5 to 
provide for civil and criminal liability against an online service provider that 
“promotes or facilitates . . . prostitution” or operates their services “in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex 
trafficking.”6 This amendment further provides a right to civil recovery and 
restitution for sex-trafficking victims against these providers.7 
Despite its noble intentions, FOSTA rapidly drew fire for its impact on 
internet speech. Although “advertising” is the only speech explicitly 
mentioned in the Act,8 FOSTA chills internet speech by curtailing immunity 
for online service providers and providing civil and criminal liability for 
promoting and facilitating prostitution or acting with “reckless disregard” for 
sex trafficking.9 Groups that advocate for free speech and decriminalizing 
sex work, like the Woodhull Freedom Foundation10 and Human Rights 
Watch,11 argue that the Act impermissibly chills their First Amendment 
rights, including the First Amendment rights of sex workers, sex-work and 




 3 FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230. 
 4 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that § 230 
shields online service providers from liability for criminal content posted by third parties); see also Eric 
Goldman, The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–9 (2017) 
(describing § 230, which shields internet service providers from claims based on third-party content, and 
important § 230 cases that illustrate the provision’s breadth). 
 5 FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A; see also Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, FOSTA: The New Anti-Sex-
Trafficking Legislation May Not End the Internet, but It’s Not Good Law Either, LAWFARE (Mar. 28, 
2018, 2:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fosta-new-anti-sex-trafficking-legislation-may-not-end-
internet-its-not-good-law-either [https://perma.cc/9VYZ-YK5Z] (describing FOSTA’s provisions and 
amendments to the CDA and the Mann Act). 
 6 FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A(b). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. sec. 2, § 230 (“[S]ection 230 . . . was never intended to provide legal protection to websites that 
unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the 
sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking victims . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 9 Id. sec. 3, § 2421A(b) (prohibiting use of websites to promote or facilitate prostitution and other 
acts “in reckless disregard” of sex trafficking). 
 10 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 15, Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 
334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-01552) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 11 Id. ¶ 16. 
 12 See id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 52–53; see also infra Section I.C. 
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nonadvocacy websites, such as Craigslist, have made their fears known to 
users and eliminated certain sections of their sites.13 
Advocates of decriminalizing sex work, sex workers themselves,14 and 
even some antitrafficking activists have denounced FOSTA for its effects on 
the online commercial sex trade.15 Many decriminalization advocates, for 
example, fear that their work to improve the lives of a disenfranchised, 
marginalized, and predominately female community of sex workers will 
subject them to liability under FOSTA.16 Moreover, upon FOSTA’s passage, 
websites that advocates and sex workers utilized to exchange information 
about resources for people in or seeking to leave the sex trade either shut 
down or banned all sex-work-related content for fear of liability.17 Losing 
these resources, which provided information about free services available to 
sex workers and sex-trafficking victims, as well as warnings about violent 
pimps and clients,18 also resulted in sex workers losing the ability to screen 
clients and work indoors rather than on the streets, a much riskier location.19 
In sum, FOSTA makes sex work more dangerous. Restricting speech 
related to commercial sex puts people engaged in sex work—including those 
 
 13 Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 17 (stating that Craigslist had stopped allowing advertisements by a 
massage therapist); Romano, supra note 1 (noting that Craigslist eliminated its “Personals” section due 
to concerns it might be illegal under FOSTA). 
 14 Although FOSTA uses the term “prostitution,” this Note uses the term “sex work” where possible 
in order to be more inclusive of the various forms of sex-related work affected by FOSTA’s prohibitions 
and because many involved in the sex industry prefer this term. Prostitution and Sex Work, 14 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 553, 553 n.1 (2013). 
 15 See Melissa Gira Grant, Proposed Federal Trafficking Legislation Has Surprising Opponents: 
Advocates Who Work with Trafficking Victims, APPEAL (Jan. 26, 2018), https://theappeal.org/proposed-
federal-trafficking-legislation-has-surprising-opponents-advocates-who-work-with-bf418c73d5b4 
[https://perma.cc/KFB2-X6KR]; Romano, supra note 1; see also Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 73–76 
(describing the Woodhull Freedom Foundation’s fear of liability based on its political activities regarding 
decriminalizing sex work and improving sex workers’ lives); id. ¶¶ 102–10 (describing activist and 
advocate Alex Andrews’s use of the internet to advocate for sex workers’ well-being and provide 
resources for them); Khan, supra note † (describing how FOSTA has led to internet censorship and 
affected her personally as an entrepreneur in the sex industry). 
 16 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 110–20 (describing Andrews’s fear of liability based on the 
removal of § 230 immunity). 
 17 See Emily McCombs, ‘This Bill Is Killing Us’: 9 Sex Workers on Their Lives in the Wake of 
FOSTA, HUFFPOST (May 15, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sex-workers-sesta-
fosta_us_5ad0d7d0e4b0edca2cb964d9 [https://perma.cc/YP2H-XKFR] (describing FOSTA’s impact on 
resources for sex workers).  
 18 See id.; see also Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 103–10 (describing “Rate That Rescue,” a website 
that helps sex workers find resources to improve their health and welfare). 
 19 McCombs, supra note 17. FOSTA brought increased scrutiny to online platforms that sex workers 
used to screen and find interested clients; as one woman who works as an escort stated, FOSTA is “forcing 
me to go back to the streets, walking up and down trying to find clients . . . . [Clients] know this bill is in 
effect, and trust me, they are taking full advantage of it by being more aggressive.” Id. 
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trafficked into sex work—at an elevated risk of physical harm. Indeed, since 
FOSTA’s passage, some law enforcement agencies have noted increased 
violence against sex workers.20 This effect is particularly troubling given 
pimps’ propensity to abuse sex workers, transforming their work from 
arguably voluntary to fully coerced, thereby turning these workers into sex-
trafficking victims.21 Thus, rather than ending sex trafficking as intended,22 
FOSTA makes it easier for traffickers to victimize already vulnerable 
people.23 
Overall, despite FOSTA’s important goals of combating online sex 
trafficking and allowing sex-trafficking survivors to obtain financial 
recovery, it is far from an ideal solution. Notably, FOSTA presents First 
Amendment concerns regarding its chilling effect on internet speech.24 
Indeed, FOSTA’s speech restrictions pose concerns for all kinds of internet 
speakers; it sets a precedent that could be used to support further speech 
restrictions in the future.25 What is more, by significantly curtailing online 
speech, the law’s broad provisions have effectively silenced sex workers’ 
online speech, as well as online speech advocating for decriminalizing 
prostitution and other forms of sex work.26 These workers now face threats 
 
 20 See Ted Andersen, Sarah Ravani & Megan Cassidy, The Scanner: Sex Workers Returned to SF 
Streets After Backpage.com Shut Down, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2018, 11:45 AM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/The-Scanner-Sex-workers-returned-to-SF-streets-
13304257.php [https://perma.cc/9V77-6MPC]. 
 21 See McCombs, supra note 17 (describing how pimps have begun recruiting formerly independent 
sex workers); see also Crystal A. Jackson & Jenny Heineman, Repeal FOSTA and Decriminalize Sex 
Work, 17 CONTEXTS 74, 75 (2018) (arguing that criminalizing all forms of sex work “pushes some sex 
workers to rely on managers (‘pimps’) who may be another source of violence or exploitation”); Allison 
J. Luzwick, Human Trafficking and Pornography: Using the Trafficking Victims Protection Act to 
Prosecute Trafficking for the Production of Internet Pornography, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 355, 366–67 
(2017) (arguing that some pimp–worker relationships that begin as consensual become coercive as pimps 
manipulate, threaten, defraud, and even drug workers into compliance). 
 22 H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3 (2018) (“[FOSTA] is designed to combat online sex 
trafficking . . . .”); id. at 5–6 (noting the “traumatic effects” of sex trafficking and that FOSTA will help 
survivors recover restitution and file civil claims against online service providers who profit from their 
exploitation in online ads). 
 23 See Jackson & Heineman, supra note 21, at 74; see also Luzwick supra note 21, at 361, 365, 371 
(describing how many individuals are trafficked into performing unconsented pornography and 
prostitution, often involving relationships that start as consensual and become exploitative). 
 24 See infra Sections I.A, II.I.C (explaining First Amendment doctrine and FOSTA’s implications 
for free speech). 
 25 See Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
279, 293 (2019) (arguing that FOSTA could be “just the first of a string of new statutory exceptions to 
section 230” jeopardizing the future of online speech). 
 26 See Khan, supra note † (describing how sex workers have lost their ability to engage in transactions 
and advocate for themselves online); Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 86–92 (explaining Human Rights 
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to their livelihoods and their lives, with fewer resources than ever that could 
provide meaningful aid.27 
In light of these concerns about FOSTA’s impact on online speech and 
its practical effects on sex trafficking, one might wonder how this law came 
into being at all. In approaching this question, this Note adds to the growing 
scholarly conversation around FOSTA by situating it at the intersection of 
First Amendment doctrine and feminist legal scholarship. FOSTA is part of 
a legacy of attempts by activists and lawmakers to enact laws with seemingly 
feminist or otherwise protective aims that violate the First Amendment.28 But 
like its predecessors, FOSTA fails to achieve its primary goals because it 
enacts content-restrictive provisions, the burden of which falls largely on 
already vulnerable groups. In this case, those vulnerable groups include sex-
trafficking survivors and consensual sex workers—a group consisting 
mostly of women, low-income individuals, people of color, and members of 
the LGBTQ community.29 
Part I explores some of the relevant First Amendment doctrine, focusing 
on previous examples of failed content-based speech restrictions. Part II then 
describes how FOSTA came to be and the ongoing litigation that may be its 
undoing. After Part II concludes that FOSTA, although well intentioned, is 
both unconstitutional and unwise, Part III proposes the creation of a common 
fund for survivors of sex trafficking. This solution prioritizes the well-being 
of survivors without sacrificing free-speech rights or further harming already 
marginalized groups. Survivors, sex workers, speech advocates, and society 
at large all deserve better than FOSTA. By focusing on how law can best 
help victims, rather than how it can punish offenders, it is possible to 
conceive a constitutional alternative that furthers feminist goals. 
 
Watch’s concern that their online decriminalization advocacy efforts would be seen as facilitating 
prostitution). 
 27 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 102–20 (discussing FOSTA’s potential censorship of online 
resources for sex workers and trafficking victims); McCombs, supra note 17 (describing the loss of online 
resources for many sex workers, pushing them into dangerous conditions on the streets). 
 28 See infra Section I.C. 
 29 See David Eichert, “It Ruined My Life”: FOSTA, Male Escorts, and the Construction of Sexual 
Victimhood in American Politics, 26 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 201, 217–18, 244 (2019) (describing the 
prevalence of gay men in sex work and noting the need for further research in particular to address the 
needs of nonbinary and genderqueer sex workers); Jackson & Heineman, supra note 21, at 75 (discussing 
the disproportionate effect that prohibition of sex work has on low-income and other marginalized 
populations); Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2171, 2210–11 (2019) (describing “at-risk” populations for sex trafficking, including lower-income, 
undereducated, and (often younger) LGBTQ people); Grant, supra note 15 (noting the impact of FOSTA 
on vulnerable groups of sex workers). 
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I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE 
FEMINIST PROJECT IN CONFLICT 
FOSTA and its flaws sit at the intersection of First Amendment doctrine 
and feminist jurisprudence. This Part thus briefly explores these two areas of 
law to help clarify how FOSTA fits into the existing legal landscape. It 
begins by describing a few relevant First Amendment doctrines that hint at 
FOSTA’s potential downfall. Next, it explores the goals and pitfalls of 
feminist legislation, specifically legislation arising from the anti-rape and 
anti-pornography movements. Finally, this Part illustrates the conflict that 
developed between First Amendment doctrine and protective legislation. In 
such conflicts, First Amendment principles triumphed.30 
A. A First Amendment Primer 
At its core, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting laws 
that infringe on the public’s freedom of speech.31 Although the plain text of 
the Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech,”32 the Supreme Court has never interpreted this as an 
absolute bar on all restrictions potentially affecting speech.33 The Supreme 
Court has, however, embraced a wider scope of speech as constitutionally 
protected over time. The trend toward increased speech protection began in 
the early to mid-twentieth century34 and has persisted in recent years.35 
Commercial speech, for example, moved from a lower tier to a higher level 
of protection throughout the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.36 Of course, First Amendment jurisprudence is a nuanced and ever-
 
 30 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986). 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although not relevant for the purposes of this Note, the First Amendment 
has also been incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming that the First Amendment’s prohibitions on restrictions of the 
freedom of speech and of the press apply to protect against laws by state governments through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 33 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (noting that historically the First 
Amendment has not prohibited laws against defamation, fraud, obscenity, or certain speech integral to or 
inciting imminent criminality). 
 34 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that “[t]here 
may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears 
on its face” to implicate individual rights, such as free speech). 
 35 See Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & 
POL’Y 63, 65 (2016) (arguing that the Roberts Court has “created a sort of free speech ‘Camelot’”). 
 36 See Troy L. Booher, Scrutinizing Commercial Speech, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 69, 71–72 
(2004) (describing the Court’s increasing protection of commercial speech). 
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evolving area of law, the full contours of which lie beyond the scope of this 
Note.37 
Two key First Amendment principles are particularly relevant for this 
Note: (1) a given statute cannot be overbroad in its restriction of speech,38 
and (2) where the government regulates the content of speech—as opposed 
to its time, place, or manner—the regulation is almost certainly invalid.39 
These are the attacks leveled at FOSTA, and they are also the kind of attacks 
that have successfully invalidated other legislation promoted by feminists in 
the past.40 
1. Overbreadth 
A regulation of speech is overbroad if it reaches a significant portion of 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.41 Thus, even if the 
regulation at issue only intends to target a narrow category of unlawful 
speech, to the extent it can be construed as reaching protected speech, it will 
fall victim to the overbreadth doctrine. This overbreadth doctrine therefore 
provides a lower threshold for First Amendment challenges than challenges 
based on other constitutional provisions,42 largely because of concerns about 
the chilling effect such regulations have on speech.43 Even if a statute does 
not directly target constitutionally protected speech and might not be 
enforced to abridge it, if people fear that it will, they will be less likely to 
 
 37 See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877, 877 (1963) (describing First Amendment doctrine as confusing and “unsatisfactory”). See also 
Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 338–39 
(2017) (noting that many scholars today critique First Amendment jurisprudence as “bereft of principle”). 
38 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (finding that a regulation of online 
speech was overly broad based on its impact on constitutionally protected speech). 
 39 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that time, place, and manner 
restrictions may be constitutional so long as they do not impermissibly target speech’s content, are 
justified by a significant state interest, and provide alternative speech mechanisms). 
 40 See infra Section I.C. 
 41 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 244. 
 42 See Anna Windemuth, The First Challenge to FOSTA Was Dismissed—Along with the First 
Amendment’s Unique Standing Doctrine, MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/first-challenge-fosta-was-dismissed-along-first-amendments-
unique-standing-doctrine [https://perma.cc/9X39-3F6B]. 
 43 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972) (“[G]overnmental action may be subject to 
constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights.”). 
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speak, thus chilling speech.44 As such, if the Court construes a statute as 
overbroad on its face, it will invalidate it.45 
To compound the far-reaching effect of the overbreadth doctrine, the 
Supreme Court embraces a broad scope of speech within First Amendment 
protection.46 Indeed, the Court has only established a few categorically 
unprotected forms of speech.47 Some scholars have advocated for 
interpreting the First Amendment to encompass only political speech or 
speech that conveys something of scientific, literary, artistic, or educational 
value.48 Yet the Court has continuously reaffirmed that speech need not have 
any political, artistic, educational, or scientific value to be protected by the 
First Amendment.49 Further, the government cannot escape invalidation of a 
regulation by promising not to enforce it to the fullest possible extent; this 
does nothing to negate the overly broad reach of statute’s text, which is what 
is at issue in an overbreadth challenge.50 The overbreadth doctrine, then, is 
one potent weapon against speech regulations. 
2. Content-Based Restrictions and Exceptions 
A content-based regulation is one where the government seeks to 
prohibit speech based on what the speaker is saying.51 For example, a law 
that prohibits discussing the President would be content-discriminatory.52 
Content-based restrictions are presumed invalid and thus subject to strict 
 
 44 See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1637 
(2013) (describing how people may be afraid to engage in protected speech if they are uncertain about 
whether it is criminalized). 
 45 See, e.g., Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256 (invalidating portions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act as overbroad on their face). 
 46 See Gora, supra note 35, at 65; see also Robert L. Kerr, Can Postmodernist Analysis Better Explain 
the First Amendment Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court?, 4 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 7–8 
(2014) (arguing that the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is eclectic and notable for 
including speech as constitutionally protected where scholars had argued it likely would not do so). 
 47 These include obscenity, defamation, fraud, speech that is “integral to criminal conduct,” and 
speech that incites imminent criminal conduct. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010). 
 48 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 333–39 (1995) 
(describing scholarly debate on whether the Court should distinguish between “high-value” and “low-
value” speech). 
 49 See id. at 338 (describing the Supreme Court’s affirmation of “equality of expression”); Stevens, 
559 U.S. at 479–80. 
 50 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480–81. 
 51 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722–23 (2000) (describing “viewpoint-based regulation[s]” 
and “regulation of the subject matter of messages” as constitutionally “objectionable form[s] of content-
based regulation”).  
 52 See id. at 723 n.31 (“The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only 
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” 
(citations omitted)).  
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scrutiny.53 To survive strict scrutiny and overcome this presumption, the 
government must show the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest.54 That is, the law must use the “least 
restrictive means” to advance an important governmental goal to avoid 
chilling constitutionally protected speech.55 The test for content 
discrimination therefore overlaps with the overbreadth doctrine where both 
rules disfavor regulations that touch upon too much protected speech, which 
includes the vast majority of speech. Notably, this presumption of invalidity 
becomes even stronger when the content-based restriction appears to 
discriminate against specific viewpoints.56 Returning to the earlier example, 
a law specifically prohibiting speech critical of the President would almost 
certainly be unconstitutional.57 
Historically, however, the Supreme Court has allowed content-based 
regulation of a few unprotected areas of speech, including libel, fighting 
words, obscenity, incitement, and speech integral to carrying out a crime.58 
These exceptions have been clarified and narrowed over time.59 With respect 
to obscenity, for example, the Court in Reno v. ACLU60 invalidated two 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) on First Amendment 
grounds using the strict scrutiny standard.61 Although the Court found the 
 
 53 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). 
 54 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 261, 263 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 55 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874 (a burden on speech “is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives 
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose” of the statute). 
 56 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330–34 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 
(1986). In an opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down 
an anti-pornography statute based on its viewpoint discrimination. The court specifically found that the 
legislation, which prohibited degrading depictions of women, constituted impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination by attempting to impose a nonmisogynistic mindset on pornographers and viewers. Id. 
 57 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 711 (a state’s regulation may not favor one point of view over another). Of 
course, that the Court itself has not always agreed on what constitutes a content-based restriction 
somewhat complicates this analysis. See, e.g., id. at 743–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
regulation becomes an impermissible content-based restriction based on its greater context; Justice Scalia 
would have held a regulation on demonstrations outside of abortion clinics unconstitutional because the 
context of such a regulation indicates that it necessarily targets anti-abortion protests). 
 58 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 427–28 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (describing categories of unprotected and less-protected speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 24–25 (1973) (setting out a three-part test for qualifying speech as obscene and therefore unprotected); 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (finding that the First Amendment does 
not protect speech “used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute”). 
 59 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the categorical 
exclusions from complete protection have narrowed over time). 
 60 521 U.S. 844. 
 61 Id. 
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CDA’s prohibition on transmitting “obscene” materials to minors valid,62 it 
found prohibitions on transmitting “indecent” and “patently offensive” 
materials too expansive to withstand strict scrutiny.63 It did not matter that 
this legislation was intentionally modeled after the Supreme Court’s own 
obscenity test, which allows regulation of works designed to “appeal to the 
‘prurient’ interest” in sex, lacking “serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value,” and depicting explicit sexual conduct in a way that is 
“patently offensive.”64 
Another First Amendment exception relevant to FOSTA is speech 
integral to criminal conduct, which the Court has construed particularly 
narrowly.65 Speech falls into this category when it is inextricably intertwined 
with criminal conduct such that the two feed into each other.66 Child 
pornography is one example: pornographic pictures of children are 
unprotected speech because they can only be obtained through criminal child 
sexual abuse.67 As such, laws prohibiting child pornography do not violate 
the First Amendment. 
A related category of unprotected speech is incitement of imminent 
lawless action.68 States and the federal government may impose restrictions 
on preparations for actual, imminent criminal conduct, including speech.69 
As an example, laws against soliciting child pornography fall under this 
exception because selling and purchasing—although commercial speech—
imminently incite the crimes of making, possessing, or distributing child 
pornography.70 In contrast, speech that merely advocates lawbreaking but 
does not directly advance a criminal act is not within this narrow exception.71 
 
 62 Id. at 883. 
 63 Id. at 874, 885. 
 64 Id. at 873; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (delineating a three-prong test 
for what constitutes obscenity). 
 65 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 66 See id.  
 67 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“The distribution of photographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . .”). 
 68 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding advocacy for 
violence is different than inciting imminent violence and thus cannot be regulated). 
 69 See id. at 448 (noting that advocacy for or “abstract teaching” about the moral need for violent 
insurrection “is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action” (quoting 
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961))).  
 70 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (upholding prohibitions on the 
solicitation and pandering of child pornography under Brandenburg’s incitement exception doctrine). 
 71 See supra Section I.C (discussing courts’ condemnation of “thought control” statutes). 
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For example, activists may not be prohibited from advocating for violent 
revolution as long as their speech is not actually inciting imminent violence.72 
In sum, the First Amendment protects the vast majority of speech. But, 
as the next Section explains, at the same time that the Court was expanding 
the First Amendment’s reach, feminist scholars and activists were 
advocating for very different legal reforms. 
B. Emerging Feminist Legislation and Its Challenges 
Just as the Supreme Court started broadening the First Amendment’s 
purview, a burgeoning feminist movement began gaining traction in the 
United States.73 It is difficult to provide a single, accurate definition of 
“feminism”; although usually united by broad principles against misogyny, 
the feminist movement has never been monolithic.74 Diverse factions 
emerged during the 1960s and 1970s, including radical feminists who sought 
to end male hegemony,75 formal-equality theorists who focused on achieving 
legal equality for women,76 Marxist feminists who promoted rethinking 
socialism with an eye toward gender liberation,77 womanists and Black 
feminists who focused on the racism and misogyny experienced by Black 
women in particular,78 and numerous others.79 
 
 72 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.” (footnote omitted)). 
 73 See Rosemarie Tong, Women, Pornography, and the Law, 73 ACADEME 14, 14–16, 19–20 (1987) 
(describing the growing feminist, anti-pornography, and anti-rape movements in the United States during 
the 1970s and 1980s); Rebecca Benson, Note, Pornography and the First Amendment: American 
Booksellers v. Hudnut, 9 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 153, 156 (1986) (describing the growing feminist anti-
pornography movements of the 1970s). 
 74 See Emily L. Sherwin, The Limits of Feminism, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 249 (1998) 
(noting that “there is no consensus about what feminism entails or even what its objective should be” but 
that it has “produced a number of different responses to the question what should be done on behalf of 
women”). 
75 See Ellen Willis, Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism, in THE ESSENTIAL ELLEN WILLIS 
229, 231 (Nona Willis Aronowitz ed., 1984) (describing the early radical feminist movement). 
 76 Sherwin, supra note 74, at 249–50. 
 77 See IMELDA WHELEHAN, MODERN FEMINIST THOUGHT: FROM THE SECOND WAVE TO ‘POST-
FEMINISM’ 45 (1995) (describing how Marxist feminists sought to fuse class analysis with an 
understanding of the patriarchal system). 
 78 See Patricia Hill Collins, What’s in a Name? Womanism, Black Feminism, and Beyond, 26 BLACK 
SCHOLAR 9, 9–13 (1996) (describing the debate between womanism and Black feminism and the early 
womanist and Black feminist movements in the United States). 
 79 See Loretta Kensinger, In(Quest) of Liberal Feminism, 12 HYPATIA 178, 178–80 (1997) 
(describing various categories of feminist thought and critiquing the usefulness of categorizing them at 
all). 
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While different groups embraced various approaches to achieve their 
goals, most relevant for the purposes of this Note were the efforts of some 
feminists in promoting anti-pornography and anti-rape agendas through 
legislation.80 These scholars and activists believed cultural attitudes could 
not shift fast enough, so misogynistic practices needed to be criminalized to 
help transform society.81 But legislation requires majority approval by 
lawmakers. Thus, feminists seeking to advance legislation to improve 
women’s lives found themselves in an unlikely partnership with law-and-
order politicians and cultural conservatives.82 Law-and-order politics became 
mainstream throughout the 1970s and 1980s and emphasized tougher 
policing practices and sentencing for crimes in order to deter and obtain 
retribution for criminal conduct.83 Around the same time, cultural 
conservatives increasingly influenced mainstream politics through 
promotion of what they saw as traditional Christian values.84 Anti-rape 
feminist groups and law-and-order politicians could agree on the need to 
stigmatize rape as a serious crime; anti-pornography feminists and cultural 
conservatives could agree on the dangerousness of mainstream 
 
 80 The anti-pornography movement was largely associated with radical feminists, such as scholars 
Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who saw pornography not as an expression of sexual 
freedom, but as a manifestation of violence against women by men. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985) (characterizing 
pornography as a manifestation of violent misogyny). While the anti-rape movement started out as a more 
radical movement associated with left-wing politics, it gradually became more mainstream as reformers 
began to see law not solely as an obstacle to reform but as a potential tool to be used in generating social 
reform. See ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM AND THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS 29–
32 (2013) (describing anti-rape activists’ shift toward utilizing legal reforms to combat rape in the United 
States). 
 81 See Benson, supra note 73, at 155–59 (describing how and why anti-pornography feminists turned 
to legislation when it became clear that extralegal interventions were not working); CORRIGAN, supra 
note 80, at 31–32 (arguing that feminists began supporting legal reforms as a comprehensive approach to 
social reform against rape). 
 82 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Porn in Their Words: Female Leaders in the Adult 
Entertainment Industry Address Free Speech, Censorship, Feminism, Culture and the Mainstreaming of 
Adult Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 255, 258–61 (2006) (comparing and describing the 
Republican George W. Bush Administration’s “campaign against pornography” with Professor 
MacKinnon’s feminist criticism of pornography (footnote omitted)); see also Wendy Kaminer, Feminists 
Against the First Amendment, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1992), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/11/feminists-against-the-first-amendment/305051 
[https://perma.cc/6Ku9-7NUS] (describing the unlikely anti-pornography coalition between radical 
feminists, like Professors Dworkin and MacKinnon, with conservatives, including Phyllis Schlafly and 
televangelist Jerry Falwell). 
 83 See HEATHER SCHOENFELD, BUILDING THE PRISON STATE: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 93–96 (2018) (describing how law-and-order politics started with the Nixon 
Administration and grew to new heights of popularity during the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations). 
 84 See Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing the rise of the “New Right” in the early 1980s). 
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pornography.85 But despite these surface-level agreements, feminists had 
very different understandings of the true causes of rape and pornography, 
seeing them as societal problems relating to male hegemony.86 Their 
apparent allies—law-and-order politicians and cultural conservatives—saw 
both pornography and rape more as individual moral failings deserving of 
punishment.87 As a result, the legislation that developed to address these 
issues was not so much pro-women—in the way feminists envisioned—as it 
was pro-punishment.88 
As Professor Marie Gottschalk argues, although feminists succeeded in 
drawing attention to rape and domestic violence, law enforcement officials 
and politicians saw these issues not as societal problems, but as criminal acts 
by specific, violent individuals.89 Rather than supporting a broader anti-
misogyny movement, law-and-order officials adopted policies aimed at 
increasing arrests and convictions of rapists and abusers.90 Feminist 
organizations wanted to increase awareness of the prevalence of rape and 
domestic abuse and, in doing so, gained state and federal funding to support 
rape crisis centers.91 But this funding came with a catch—rape and domestic 
violence victims in state-funded shelters were often required to file police 
reports and comply with law enforcement officials before receiving any aid.92 
Reporting requirements might seem beneficial for ending rape and 
domestic violence by catching perpetrators. However, evidence indicates 
 
 85 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 124–26 (2006) (describing how law-and-order politicians came to support 
rape-law reforms); Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing how cultural conservatives and anti-pornography 
feminists agreed on pornography as something to be quashed). 
 86 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 122, 124–27 (describing how feminists and lawmakers differed in 
their views of rape, and how ultimately lawmakers’ views predominated because feminist-led rape crisis 
centers needed government funds). 
 87 See Kaminer, supra note 82 (describing how radical feminists opposed pornography as 
discrimination against women, while cultural conservatives opposed pornography based on concerns of 
“changing sexual mores and the decline of the traditional family”). 
 88 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 131 (noting that “[w]omen’s groups entered into some 
unsavory coalitions and compromises that bolstered the law-and-order agenda and reduced their own 
capacity” to further their own feminist goals); see also Krishna de la Cruz, Comment, Exploring the 
Conflicts Within Carceral Feminism: A Call to Revocalize the Women Who Continue to Suffer, 
19 SCHOLAR 79, 95–96 (2016) (noting that domestic violence policies have prioritized punishing 
offenders over helping domestic violence victims, the majority of which have historically been women). 
 89 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 128 (describing how feminists’ social movement against rape was 
coopted and transformed into another part of law-and-order politicians’ war on crime). 
 90 See id. at 129–31. 
 91 Id. at 124–25 (describing how state and federal actors became involved in feminist anti-rape 
movements). 
 92 Id. at 126. 
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that reporting requirements can discourage victims from coming forward, 
thus preventing them from receiving the attached aid and hindering law 
enforcement.93 Victims might not report for fear of retaliation from their 
attackers, or they may simply lack the economic or emotional support 
necessary to endure an investigation and trial.94 Further, people from 
communities disproportionately targeted by punitive policing tactics might 
be extremely reluctant to turn to police at all.95 But of course, people from 
these communities—particularly people of color—often found themselves 
erased by the narratives feminists and lawmakers promoted. Instead, 
“carceral feminist” legal reforms fed into the growing system of mass 
incarceration that plundered marginalized communities.96 So, although 
feminists were able to draw attention to rape and domestic violence and 
stigmatize them as offenses, their efforts fell short when it came to actually 
supporting victims, especially those most in need of aid. 
Anti-pornography feminists faced rather different challenges in 
advancing legal reforms. Feminist scholars such as Professors Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon linked violent pornography specifically 
to violence against women.97 But as with the anti-rape and domestic-violence 
movements, people outside the feminist movement—specifically, the 
lawmakers that would pass and members of the public that would support 
anti-pornography legislation—were more inclined to see pornography as an 
individual moral failing than as a widespread manifestation of misogyny.98 
Although some scholars found a causal connection between viewing violent 
 
 93 See id. at 129, 160 (suggesting that reporting requirements are problematic due to their ignorance 
of the plight of marginalized communities that face discriminatory treatment by police). 
 94 See Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, 31 SOC. PROBS. 459, 459 
(1984). 
 95 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 129, 160 (describing how anti-rape reformers ignored 
concerns of Black women and Latinas about overly punitive practices); see also de la Cruz, supra note 
88, at 98–99 (arguing that women of color and immigrant women face increased, unjustified arrest rates 
and other mistreatment from police, hindering their ability to report and cooperate with law enforcement). 
 96 See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the “New Abolitionism,” 18 DIFFERENCES 128, 
143 (2007) (describing “carceral feminism,” through which feminists achieved rape-law reform through 
tapping into punitive impulses, thus contributing to mass incarceration); see also de la Cruz, supra note 
88, at 80–81 (defining carceral feminism and the resultant “gender and racial discrimination in the legal 
system”).  
 97 Benson, supra note 73, at 156–61 (describing the legislation proposed by Professors MacKinnon 
and Dworkin). 
 98 See generally Tong, supra note 73, at 14 (describing cultural conservatives’ view of pornography 
as an individual moral failing as in contrast to anti-pornography feminists’ belief that pornography is a 
widespread symptom of systemic misogyny). 
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pornography and sexual violence,99 feminists struggled to convince people 
of the connection between pornography and misogyny.100 As a result, they 
found themselves allied with cultural conservatives who opposed 
pornography, not for its violence and misogyny, but for its sexual content, 
which fell outside of their views of acceptable expressions of sexuality.101 
Although anti-pornography legislation failed to take hold at state and 
federal levels in the United States, ordinances made headway in some 
cities.102 But jurisdictions that had these rules did not always enforce them 
the way feminists had hoped. Specifically, enforcement targeted 
pornography that fell outside mainstream views of acceptable sexual conduct 
rather than works that depicted rape and violence against women.103 The 
ordinances that passed in the United States were either vetoed or enjoined on 
First Amendment grounds before they could be enforced,104 but in Canada, 
where similar rules existed, the content most susceptible to anti-pornography 
enforcement was actually erotic content geared toward the LGBTQ 
community.105 This was the opposite of the result anti-pornography feminists 
intended, as they viewed pornography portraying heterosexual violence by 
men against women as most harmful.106 These enforcement practices 
 
 99 See Lynne Segal, Pornography and Violence: What the ‘Experts’ Really Say, 36 FEMINIST REV. 
29, 29 (1990) (arguing that although there might be some evidence linking pornography and violent 
attitudes, it is inconclusive). 
 100 See, e.g., Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 351, 351–
52 (1993) (criticizing the anti-pornography movement’s claims as factually incorrect and patronizing). 
 101 See id. at 358 (arguing that the feminist anti-porn movement began to align itself with cultural 
conservatives who otherwise disavowed feminism). 
 102 Benson, supra note 73, at 153 n.2, 155 n.6 (noting that Indianapolis and Minneapolis passed 
versions of the Dworkin and MacKinnon ordinance, and several other cities and federal lawmakers 
considered but ultimately declined to adopt similar pornography regulations). 
 103 Compare Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornography After Little Sisters Book and Art 
Emporium: A Call for Gay Male Cooperation in the Struggle for Sex Equality, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
21, 21–24 (1997) (describing how Canada’s obscenity laws aimed at pornography were enforced 
disparately against gay and lesbian pornography), with Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: 
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 10–13 (1985) (arguing for banning 
pornography as material that depicts and promotes extreme violence against women). 
 104 See Benson, supra note 73, at 155 n.6 (describing how an ordinance passed by a city council was 
vetoed by the mayor and other proposed legislation was defeated); Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 
771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court’s injunction against and invalidation of an 
anti-pornography ordinance), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 105 See Kendall, supra note 103, at 21–24 (describing the discriminatory enforcement practices that 
led to the censorship of pornography targeting gay and lesbian audiences but not pornography created to 
appeal to straight men); see also Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 1120, paras. 112–23 (Can.) (affirming the lower court’s findings that gay and lesbian bookstores 
suffered disproportionate effects from the censorship laws). 
 106 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 16–20 (arguing against the proliferation of mainstream 
pornography that depicts women as victims of sexual violence by men). 
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demonstrate the problems of adopting content-restrictive measures: they are 
enforced based on existing societal values and stigmas, such as those against 
LGBTQ people, rather than with the mindsets of their feminist drafters.107 
The ordinances also received substantial criticism from other feminist 
scholars, who saw them as harmful to free speech and patronizing to 
women.108 
As the next Section explains, such concerns were short-lived. These 
ordinances and other protective legislation premised on restricting harmful 
speech soon ran headlong into the First Amendment. 
C. The Pornography Cases: Protective Legislation on the Chopping Block 
This Section explores some feminist-driven legislation that fell prey to 
First Amendment challenges, as well as other protective legislation that, 
while not explicitly feminist, was based on a similar rationale of restricting 
harmful speech to protect vulnerable groups. This Section thus begins by 
analyzing the invalidation of Indianapolis’s anti-pornography ordinance. 
Next, it explores the invalidation of provisions of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act and the Communications Decency Act, both of which sought 
to restrict harmful internet speech. 
1. American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut 
In 1984, Indianapolis adopted an anti-pornography ordinance based on 
the one proposed by Professors Dworkin and MacKinnon.109 The ordinance 
targeted pornographic pictures or texts that depicted women—or anyone 
else—as “sexual objects” being humiliated, physically abused, tortured, 
raped, or dominated.110 A variety of distributors and consumers of literature 
and films challenged the statute as unconstitutional.111 The ordinance, they 
alleged, was so overbroad as to proscribe great swaths of constitutionally 
 
 107 See Kendall, supra note 103, at 22 (noting that Professors MacKinnon and Dworkin condemned 
Canada’s discriminatory practices); see also de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 98–102 (describing how laws 
intended to protect women may be used against them due to law enforcement biases). 
 108 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 100, at 353 (critiquing the feminist anti-pornography movement); 
Tong, supra note 73, at 19–20 (same). 
 109 Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 24 (1984); see also Benson, supra note 
73, at 153 n.2 (noting the basis of the ordinance was a model law conceived by Professors Dworkin and 
MacKinnon and describing surrounding scholarship and the legislative history of the law). 
 110 Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 24 § 16-3(v) (1984); see also Am. 
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 111 Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 326–27. 
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protected speech,112 even potentially censoring acclaimed literature, such as 
the works of William Butler Yeats, James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, and 
Homer.113 
Supporters of the ordinance stressed the connection between depictions 
of violence against women and viewer attitudes, pointing to some evidence 
that exposure to violent pornography promotes violent, misogynistic 
attitudes.114 Although some supporters argued the ordinance’s reach was 
narrower than what the plaintiffs alleged, not all found its potential inclusion 
of great literature startling. As Professor MacKinnon argued, if something 
depicts degradation and abuse of women, “why should it matter that the work 
has other value?”115 
The federal courts agreed with the plaintiffs who challenged the 
ordinance. In American Booksellers v. Hudnut,116 the Seventh Circuit focused 
on the fact that nearly all speech, even speech that most people find 
detestable, enjoys constitutional protection.117 Obscenity, which may be 
lawfully restricted, constitutes a narrow category of speech, limited to the 
most sexually graphic, “patently offensive,” and otherwise valueless 
content.118 Thus, any statute likely to censor content containing any artistic 
or literary value exceeds obscenity’s parameters and violates the First 
Amendment.119 Because the anti-pornography ordinance’s scope reached 
content with at least some artistic, literary, or other value, the district court 
correctly found it overbroad.120 
 
 112 See id. at 326–27 (explaining the district court’s holding that the ordinance was “vague and 
overbroad” and noting that plaintiffs collectively had interests in a wide range of material that could be 
affected by the ordinance). 
 113 Id. at 325, 327. 
 114 Id. at 325, 329. 
 115 Id. at 325 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 80, at 21).  
 116 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 117 See id. at 327–29 (describing the breadth of First Amendment protections and explaining that 
“above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because 
of its message [or] its ideas ” (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))). 
 118 Id. at 324; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973). 
 119 Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 324, 331–32; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 26 (explaining that 
“patently offensive” depictions or descriptions of sexual content may still be protected if, at a minimum, 
they have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
 120 The district court held that the ordinance was overbroad. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 326. 
The Seventh Circuit focused on the ordinance’s viewpoint-discriminatory nature, specifically finding the 
ordinance was unconstitutional because it “discriminate[d] on the ground of the content of speech.” Id. at 
325; see also id. at 328, 332. The Seventh Circuit also noted that “Indianapolis left out of its definition 
any reference to literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 331. 
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The Seventh Circuit further reasoned that the ordinance’s specific 
prohibition on misogynistic pornography constituted not only a content-
based restriction on speech, but also impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.121 The ordinance’s intent to address the correlation between 
violent pornography and violent attitudes itself was unlawful; unpleasant 
though it may be, filmmakers and erotic novelists have the constitutional 
right to promote violently misogynistic content and beliefs.122 
Feminist critics particularly revile this line of reasoning. Why should 
hatred of women be a protected point of view under the First Amendment?123 
Why would courts act in the best interest of pornographers and violent 
misogynists? Certainly, such critics make strong normative arguments about 
the value of restricting the promulgation of violent, misogynistic content, 
and courts are not always paragons of neutrality.124 But courts have 
steadfastly maintained First Amendment protections for distasteful sexual 
content. As the next Section shows, this includes even lewd content 
appearing to depict children. 
2. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and Reno v. ACLU 
Although anti-pornography ordinances failed to gain traction, the 
federal government did adopt legislation targeting pornography in other 
ways. About a decade after the Indianapolis ordinance’s invalidation, 
Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA).125 Although 
not an explicitly feminist project like the anti-pornography ordinance, the 
CPPA relied on similar logic regarding pornography’s effects on viewers’ 
thoughts and actions toward those depicted in it. Specifically, the CPPA 
prohibited not just actual child pornography, but “virtual child pornography” 
as well.126 Virtual child pornography may be created using adult actors that 
 
 121 Id. at 328, 332. 
 122 See id. at 327–32. 
 123 See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, Essay, Thoughts About Why the First Amendment Operates to Stifle 
the Freedom and Equality of a Subordinated Majority, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 25, 26, 28–31 (1999) 
(describing how courts have used the First Amendment to justify allowing women to suffer harms in 
order to avoid harms to free speech in society at large, particularly protecting speech primarily used by 
men). 
 124 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2446–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that majority decisions have favored religious neutrality for Christians, as in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, but not for Muslims under President Trump’s travel ban). 
 125 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A, 2256), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 
234 (2002). 
 126 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (defining “child pornography” to include a “computer-generated image or 
picture” that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression that the material is . . . of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct”).  
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pretend to be minors or using completely computer-generated images.127 Like 
the proponents of Indianapolis’s ordinance, the lawmakers behind the CPPA 
believed that cutting off access to material depicting sexual abuse of 
children—even if it did not actually show any real children—would decrease 
incidents of child sexual abuse and real child pornography.128 Just as anti-
pornography activists argued that violent, misogynistic pornography stoked 
violent attitudes toward women, lawmakers thought that images of virtual 
child pornography could transform otherwise nondangerous viewers into 
full-fledged pedophiles with “appetites” for real child pornography.129 
As controversial as adult pornography is, child pornography is 
universally condemned. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that 
it is inextricably linked to child sexual abuse and thus completely excluded 
from First Amendment protection.130 As such, lawmakers believed that even 
though the CPPA’s virtual child-pornography ban went a step beyond actual 
child pornography, it would nonetheless pass constitutional muster.131 It did 
not. 
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, various producers and distributers 
of erotic literature and film challenged the CPPA’s ban on virtual child 
pornography under the First Amendment.132 They pointed to numerous works 
of literature and film that could be censored as a result of the law, including 
Romeo and Juliet and the Oscar-winning films American Beauty and 
Traffic.133 Although the district court found these arguments unpersuasive, 
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court found the CPPA provisions 
overbroad on their face.134 The provisions swept far too much 
constitutionally protected speech within their grasp, and the Supreme Court 
thus affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding.135 
Moreover, the Supreme Court, like the Seventh Circuit in American 
Booksellers, expressed concerns over the legislation’s attempt to influence 
 
 127 See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241–42 (describing what constituted virtual child pornography 
under the CPPA). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 241, 253. 
 130 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (classifying child pornography as 
unprotected speech). 
 131 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110 Stat. 3009-
26, -27 (congressional findings regarding the problems with actual and virtual child pornography). 
 132 535 U.S. at 243. 
 133 Id. at 247–48. 
 134 Id. at 243–44, 256. 
 135 See id. at 240, 256 (finding that the CPPA went beyond the compelling interest of preventing 
child sexual abuse as articulated in Ferber and abridged a “substantial amount of lawful speech”). 
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thought and behavior.136 Violent, misogynistic daydreams and perverse 
thoughts about children are still merely thoughts and therefore beyond 
government control.137 The legislature may only proscribe speech that is 
integral to or directly incites criminal deeds, not speech that advocates for or 
imagines criminal behavior.138 
The Court’s holding in this case disturbed politicians and advocates, 
who saw a correlation between the proliferation of virtual child pornography 
and the demand for actual child pornography.139 But the decision was 
consistent with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.140 The Court had 
narrowly cabined the parameters of unprotected speech,141 and the CPPA’s 
provisions went beyond those parameters. Like the Indianapolis ordinance, 
it could not stand, no matter the good intentions of its legislators. 
Similarly, in Reno v. ACLU,142 the Supreme Court invalidated 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that proscribed the 
“indecent transmission” of sexually graphic and “patently offensive” images 
to minors over the internet.143 Like the Indianapolis ordinance and the CPPA, 
several CDA provisions sought to restrict the dissemination of harmful 
 
 136 Id. at 253; Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986). 
 137 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330 (“Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on 
television, reporters’ biases—these and many more influence the culture and shape our socialization . . . . 
[A]ll is protected as speech, however insidious.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination . . . . 
[The Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.”). 
 138 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (seeking to prohibit beliefs is not a valid way to reduce crime). But 
see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (upholding prohibiting pandering or soliciting 
child pornography under the incitement exception); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) 
(noting that advertising and selling child pornography are integral to producing illegal materials). 
 139 See Sara C. Marcy, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is There Any Way Around Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2136, 2147–48 (2003) (describing how lawmakers responded 
to Free Speech Coalition by “attempting to strengthen the connection between virtual child pornography 
and harm to actual children”). 
 140 Gora, supra note 35, at 75–80 (arguing that the Roberts Court has rightfully broadened free speech 
protections). 
 141 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–64 (describing child pornography as integral to criminal conduct and 
unprotected due to its lack of any legitimate value); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) 
(per curiam) (distinguishing advocacy for violence from actual incitement to violence and protecting the 
former from government regulation). 
 142 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 143 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended 
at 47 U.S.C. § 223), invalidated in part by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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imagery to an influential audience, specifically children.144 But the Supreme 
Court reasoned that no matter the statute’s intentions, it was overbroad 
because it was not narrowly tailored to only apply to obscene material.145 
Even though this CDA provision was modeled after the Supreme Court’s 
test, which described obscenity as content specifically designed to appeal to 
“the prurient interest,” features “patently offensive” sexual conduct, and 
otherwise lacks any other value, the provision was still not narrow enough.146 
That is, material can technically be offensive and violently or sexually 
graphic without being utterly valueless and obscene, and thus, unprotected. 
So, the Court struck down the CDA provisions.147 
The Indianapolis ordinance, the CPPA’s ban on virtual child 
pornography, and the CDA’s prohibition on transmitting graphic material to 
minors were based on similar logic: images and descriptions of graphic 
sexual content damage viewers, leading them down paths of sexual depravity 
or violence that feminists, law-and-order politicians, and cultural 
conservatives condemned for their own reasons.148 But the First Amendment 
proscribes legislation premised on controlling thoughts, even if those 
thoughts tend toward criminality. Thus, the coalition of feminists, cultural 
conservatives, and lawmakers lost the battle against pornography. 
Nevertheless, this coalition would go on to take up arms once again against 
a new societal ill, creating legislation farther away from the old “thought 
control” model, but still rooted in restricting content. As the next Part argues, 
this is how FOSTA came to be. 
II. FOSTA IN CONTEXT AND IN COURT 
This Part describes FOSTA’s origins and the ongoing litigation against 
it. First, it explores § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and 
courts’ generous interpretation of it, which allowed online service providers 
to avoid liability for profiting from online sex trafficking. Second, it 
 
 144 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (prohibiting the knowing transmission of obscene materials or child 
pornography to minors using a telecommunications device); id. § 223(d) (prohibiting knowingly 
transmitting patently offensive material over the internet to minors). 
 145 Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74 (finding the statute exceeded the narrow confines of unprotected 
obscenity). 
 146 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 147 Reno, 521 U.S. at 873–74. 
 148 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 124–26 (describing how feminists saw rape and domestic 
violence as widespread social issues while lawmakers focused on them as individual crimes); Kaminer, 
supra note 82 (explaining how radical feminists opposed pornography as discrimination against women, 
while cultural conservatives opposed pornography based on concerns of “changing sexual mores and the 
decline of the traditional family”). 
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describes FOSTA’s immediate impact on sex workers, advocates, free-
speech proponents, and sex-trafficking survivors. Finally, it assesses 
FOSTA’s defensibility under the First Amendment, concluding that FOSTA 
is unwise and likely unconstitutional. 
A. FOSTA’s Origins: Section 230 and the Backpage Investigation 
Reno v. ACLU was not the only significant case dealing with the CDA. 
While the Supreme Court invalidated CDA provisions that penalized the 
knowing transmission or display of “indecent” or “patently offensive” 
materials to minors,149 another provision, § 230, shielded internet service 
providers from liability for unlawful conduct committed by its users.150 The 
catalyst for § 230 was Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,151 
wherein a New York state court found an online service provider liable for 
defamation claims arising from content posted by a third party on its 
website.152 Lawmakers feared that such cases would hamper the development 
of the internet—online service providers would either excessively censor 
user content or not get into the internet business at all if they thought they 
might be liable for someone else’s unlawful conduct.153 Section 230 thus 
promoted the public’s interest in the free exchange of ideas by shielding 
online service providers from punishment for their users’ misdeeds. 
Although § 230 originally emphasized the need for “good-faith” 
monitoring by online service providers to protect unwitting users from 
graphic sexual or violent content, courts interpreted it as an all-inclusive safe 
harbor.154 Courts held that § 230 provided broad immunity for all providers 
that were merely distributing third-party content rather than creating content 
 
 149 Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. 
 150 See generally Andrew P. Bolson, Flawed but Fixable: Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act at 20, 42 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1, 8 (2016) (describing the purposes of § 230 
of the CDA, including shielding internet service providers from liability). 
 151 No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011). 
 152 Id.; see Bolson, supra note 150, at 3–6 (describing how § 230 functioned as a response to Stratton 
Oakmont). 
 153 Bolson, supra note 150, at 6–8. 
 154 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also id. § 230(b)(3)–(5) (describing Congress’s intent to incentivize 
development of filtering and other technologies to protect children from exposure to inappropriate 
materials); see also Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 563–64 (2018) (describing how § 230 was intended to 
provide limited immunity for internet service providers). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
526 
themselves.155 Although most of these initial cases dealt with defamation,156 
courts later interpreted the statute to provide broad immunity against other 
claims as well.157 Eventually, a line of cases established online service 
providers as immune from claims regarding the advertisement of sex 
trafficking and child sexual exploitation on their sites.158 These cases and 
their unsettling results captured the attention of feminists, antitrafficking 
activists, and eventually lawmakers. 
In Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC,159 for example, the minor 
plaintiffs brought state and federal law claims against Backpage for hosting 
posts advertising them for commercial sex.160 The First Circuit upheld a grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the defendant Backpage, a website 
infamous for allowing advertisements for commercial sex, including those 
posted by traffickers.161 The First Circuit followed the logic of courts around 
the country, interpreting § 230 to provide broad immunity for online service 
providers and emphasizing congressional intent to protect providers and 
 
 155 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant 
online service provider could not be liable for exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions” 
under § 230 where it failed to remove defamatory content in a timely manner); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 
718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that § 230 preempted state civil law claims against the 
defendant and that holding it liable would be contrary to Congress’s stated intent of promoting internet 
development). But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Roommates.com could be liable under § 230 where it functioned as a content provider by 
requiring users to enter information into the site which illegally discriminated based on race, sexual 
orientation, and other factors). 
 156 See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (holding defendant service provider not liable in a defamation 
case); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting AOL’s motion for summary 
judgment in a defamation case based on § 230); see also Leary, supra note 154, at 576 (“[C]ase law was 
built on this idea of broad immunity, derived frequently from defamation cases.”). 
 157 See Leary, supra note 154, at 573 (noting that § 230 can be held to protect websites from claims 
related to stalking and nonconsensual pornography); id. at 575 (describing § 230 immunity for online 
service providers against claims of distributing child pornography); id. at 576 & n.113. 
 158 See id. at 578–82; see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(holding sex-trafficking survivors could not hold Backpage owners civilly liable for profiting from 
exploitative advertisements of them as minors posted on their website); see also Backpage.com, LLC v. 
Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding Cook County Sheriff could not target credit card companies 
doing business with Backpage in order to prevent it from coordinating commercial sex transactions).  
 159 817 F.3d 12. 
 160 Id. at 16. These claims included violations of federal law, specifically the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which provides a civil remedy for victims of trafficking against 
traffickers, and copyright laws prohibiting the unauthorized use of one’s photograph, as well as state law 
claims for human trafficking, unfair and deceptive trade practices by Backpage, and unauthorized use of 
personal images by Backpage for commercial gain. Id. at 17, 28. 
 161 See id. at 29. 
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avoid chilling internet speech.162 The court further emphasized that it was a 
job for Congress—not courts—to change § 230 so that sex-trafficking 
survivors like the plaintiffs could recover against Backpage.163 
Bolstered by a coalition of feminists, religious leaders, and law-and-
order politicians,164 Congress took heed. The Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations began examining online sex trafficking in 
2015, specifically targeting Backpage and its hosting of sex-trafficking-
related advertisements.165 In 2017, the committee made a formal report of its 
findings: Backpage’s moderators had edited ads hinting at commercial sex 
with minors by removing banned words to allow the ads to stay up.166 This 
active editing actually fell outside of § 230’s protection for merely 
publishing third-party content, so federal officials seized Backpage and shut 
it down.167 
Despite the victory against Backpage, Congress decided to tighten 
§ 230’s protections to deter future online service providers from engaging in 
these tactics in an attempt to escape civil or criminal liability.168 The FOSTA 
 
 162 Id. at 23; see also Leary, supra note 154, at 575–77 (describing the rise of § 230 immunity for 
websites that allowed sex-trafficking advertisements). 
 163 See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 22–23, 29. 
 164 See Melissa Gira Grant, Beyond Strange Bedfellows: How the “War on Trafficking” Was Made 
to Unite the Left and Right, PUB. EYE, http://feature.politicalresearch.org/beyond-strange-bedfellows 
[https://perma.cc/5S94-4AGK] (describing how lawmakers were influenced by antitrafficking activists 
from all along the political spectrum in enacting FOSTA); see also Bernstein, supra note 96 (describing 
the alliance between evangelicals, conservative lawmakers, and feminists in the antitrafficking movement 
in the years prior to FOSTA). 
 165 See Jonathan O’Connell & Tom Jackman, Members of Congress Press Sessions to Investigate 




 166 U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING 
FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 16–21 (2017), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Backpage%20Report%202017.01.10%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3Y7-HMNF] [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 167 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Leads Efforts to Seize Backpage.com, the 
Internet’s Leading Forum for Prostitution Ads, and Obtains 93-Count Federal Indictment (Apr. 9, 2018) 
[hereinafter Justice Department Leads Efforts to Seize Backpage.com], 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-leads-effort-seize-backpagecom-internet-s-leading-
forum-prostitution-ads [https://perma.cc/G7KG-SX5V] (describing Backpage’s seizure by federal law 
enforcement officials for facilitating prostitution). 
 168 FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, sec. 2, § 230, 132 Stat. 1253, 1253 (2018); see also Tom Jackman, 
House Committee Targets Online Sex Trafficking by Amending Mann Act, Puzzling Advocates, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 12, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-
crime/wp/2017/12/12/house-committee-targets-online-sex-trafficking-by-amending-mann-act-puzzling-
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package passed both the House and the Senate with overwhelming bipartisan 
support,169 and President Trump signed the bill into law on April 11, 2018.170 
As discussed above, FOSTA amends § 230 to clarify that it does not shield 
websites that promote or facilitate prostitution or that act with reckless 
disregard for sex trafficking by allowing advertisements for “unlawful sex 
acts.”171 It further amends the Mann Act, an existing anti-prostitution law, to 
provide a right of civil recovery and restitution against internet service 
providers that promote or facilitate prostitution or recklessly disregard sex 
trafficking.172 Despite this apparent bipartisan victory for sex-trafficking 
survivors, who would ostensibly now be able to hold internet service 
providers that facilitated their exploitation accountable, public reactions to 
FOSTA were not uniformly positive. 
B. FOSTA’s Reality 
Although some sex trafficking survivors and advocates hailed FOSTA 
as a critical step toward achieving justice for survivors and ending sex 
trafficking,173 others expressed reservations as to its scope and likely 
success.174 Tech companies and free-speech groups spoke out against 
FOSTA, arguing that it unduly abridges First Amendment rights.175 Sex 
workers and decriminalization activists also opposed FOSTA’s apparent 
restrictions on internet speech, arguing that FOSTA would limit their 
political speech by penalizing the promotion or facilitation of prostitution.176 
As a preliminary matter, FOSTA’s focus on “advertising” does little to 
assuage these fears; the rest of the Act’s broad language clarifies that, while 
 
advocates/?utm_term=.12029d169876 [https://perma.cc/84TQ-7JWD] (describing Congress’s attempts 
to hold websites like Backpage accountable and part of the process of creating FOSTA). 




 170 FOSTA; Romano, supra note 1. 
 171 FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230. 
 172 Id. sec. 3, § 2421A. 
 173 See, e.g., World Without Exploitation, supra note 2. 
 174 See Grant, supra note 15 (describing various sex-trafficking survivor–advocates’ views opposing 
FOSTA based on its targeting of prostitution and sex work and its lack of support for victims outside of 
allowing for civil litigation). 
 175 See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 5; see also Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2018) (arguing that § 230 is necessary for fulfilling free-speech values 
and should be part of the First Amendment rule). 
 176 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 76, 91 (describing Woodhull Freedom Foundation’s and Human 
Rights Watch’s fears that their political activities advocating for decriminalizing sex work, but not sex 
trafficking, will render them liable under § 230). 
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Congress was particularly concerned with sex-trafficking ads, websites that 
otherwise promote or facilitate prostitution or simply fail to prevent third 
parties from using their website for trafficking are likewise subject to civil 
and criminal liability.177 The Woodhull Freedom Foundation, a human rights 
group that emphasizes sexual freedom, opposed FOSTA early on, fearing 
that its online advertisements about a conference featuring speakers 
advocating for decriminalizing sex work would render it liable under 
FOSTA.178 Essentially, Woodhull and other advocates have feared that 
FOSTA’s provisions hamper all sex- and sex-work-related speech in 
violation of the First Amendment.179 
Although FOSTA has not yet been enforced against advocates, it has 
incentivized online service providers to restrict perfectly legal speech on 
their platforms.180 For example, in December 2018, Tumblr, a popular 
blogging platform, banned “adult content” in an effort to avoid scrutiny for 
its users’ sex-related posts.181 Its goal was legitimate and certainly warranted 
based on Tumblr’s continuous issues in ridding its site of illegal child 
pornography and other distasteful fare.182 Unfortunately, the algorithms that 
the site used to execute this mission incorrectly identified countless innocent 
posts as pornographic, including art, images of political protests, and utterly 
innocuous images of fully clothed women.183 A private company like Tumblr 
may lawfully limit the content it hosts, and it has no duty to do so 
competently. Still, this provides one example of the kind of speech harms 
that FOSTA’s critics fear. To those concerned with FOSTA’s long-term 
 
 177 See FOSTA, sec. 2, § 230 (amending § 230 to clarify that websites could not escape liability for 
sex-trafficking advertisements posted by their users); id. sec. 3, § 2421A (amending the Mann Act to 
provide for civil and criminal liability for websites that violate the Act’s terms). 
 178 Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 64–78. 
 179 See id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 180 See id. ¶¶ 52–60 (describing FOSTA’s immediate impact on online speech). 
 181 See Shannon Liao, Tumblr Will Ban All Adult Content on December 17th, VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018, 
12:26 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18123752/tumblr-adult-content-porn-ban-date-
explicit-changes-why-safe-mode [https://perma.cc/B5WB-6V8Y]; Paris Martineau, Tumblr’s Porn Ban 
Reveals Who Controls What We See Online, WIRED (Dec. 4, 2018, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/tumblrs-porn-ban-reveals-controls-we-see-online [https://perma.cc/R8JT-
XRNM] (linking Tumblr’s decision to ban adult content, and similar patterns followed by other websites 
like Craigslist and Patreon, to FOSTA). 
 182 Liao, supra note 181. 
 183 See Martineau, supra note 181 (describing problems with Tumblr’s flagging system that included 
photos of Jesus Christ, patents for shoes, landscape drawings, and other innocent content); see also 
Kaitlyn Tiffany, Tumblr’s First Year Without Porn, ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/12/tumblr-year-review-2019-nsfw-ban-
memes/602911 [https://perma.cc/A46F-EZ37] (noting that the adult-content ban “scared users away who 
might actually have been fine, and it still didn’t kill the porn bots and spammy ads”). 
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impact, such restrictions herald the beginning of the end for “the internet as 
we know it” by discouraging speech that is outside community norms but 
nonetheless constitutionally protected.184 
Sex workers and advocates have also argued that FOSTA harms both 
sex workers and sex-trafficking victims by conflating voluntary sex work 
and sex trafficking.185 FOSTA’s provisions that equate consensual 
prostitution with coerced sex trafficking, providing liability for websites that 
facilitate either, led various websites to shut down portions of their site used 
by voluntary sex workers to exchange information about free health services 
and dangerous clients and pimps.186 This, in turn, forced sex workers to return 
to the streets to market their services, where they are much more likely to 
encounter violence.187 Similarly, rather than putting sex traffickers out of 
business, some evidence shows that FOSTA only drove them further 
underground, making it harder to apprehend traffickers and save victims.188 
Additionally, FOSTA’s conflation of sex work and sex trafficking is 
part of an ongoing trend that discourages sex-trafficking survivors from 
coming forward for fear of being treated as criminals rather than victims.189 
This seems especially likely given that many sex-trafficking survivors report 
consenting to some acts at the beginning of their relationship with a 
trafficker, who may start out by “grooming” victims and acting like a 
 
 184 See Khan, supra note †; Romano, supra note 1. 
 185 See McCombs, supra note 17; see also Grant, supra note 15 (noting the argument by some 
antitrafficking advocates to employ a rights-based response that differentiates between trafficking and 
sex work, a perspective that has been eroded by policies that link the two). 
 186 See McCombs, supra note 17; Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 105–15 (describing one activist’s 
fear that her website providing resources to sex workers and sex-trafficking survivors could lead her to 
be held liable, and the concern that without this information, sex workers and trafficking survivors will 
lack access to helpful resources and information pertaining to their safety). 
 187 See McCombs, supra note 17; Anderson et al., supra note 20 (describing increased violence 
against and arrests of sex workers since FOSTA’s passage). 
 188 See Anderson et al., supra note 20; see also Jordan Fischer, Running Blind: IMPD Arrests First 
Suspected Pimp in 7 Months, INDY CHANNEL (Dec. 12, 2018, 10:40 AM), 
https://www.theindychannel.com/longform/running-blind-impd-arrests-first-suspected-pimp-in-7-
months [https://perma.cc/JX4H-NQLM] (describing how the absence of Backpage or other sources of 
online advertising for sex work has dried up police information on sex traffickers and pimps); see also 
Eichert, supra note 29, at 208 (describing how sex traffickers have either moved offline or to platforms 
hosted on servers in foreign countries that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement). 
 189 See Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare Is Served?, 24 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 438–39 (1998) (describing how women engaged in sex work are 
often criminalized while purchasers of sex work, typically men, are not); see also Elizabeth Kaigh, Note, 
Whores and Other Sex Slaves: Why the Equation of Prostitution with Sex Trafficking in the William 
Wilberforce Reauthorization Act of 2008 Promotes Gender Discrimination, 12 SCHOLAR 139, 159–62 
(2009) (describing how law enforcement’s confusion between consensual sex workers and trafficking 
victims makes focusing on enforcing anti-prostitution laws against sex workers all the more troubling). 
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romantic partner before assuming the role of trafficker.190 Moreover, anti-
prostitution laws have historically been overenforced against those “selling” 
sex, usually women, rather than those soliciting sex, usually men.191 Fears of 
wrongful enforcement against victims and voluntary sex workers are also 
supported by some of the effects of previous feminist legislation, which was 
enforced against marginalized communities rather than the legislation’s 
original targets.192 And at least one scholar has empirically documented 
FOSTA’s consequences for gay and queer men in the San Francisco area, 
who have lost income and increasingly fear for their safety as much of the 
online sex industry in all its iterations significantly contracted.193 Yet another 
commentator deemed FOSTA “a law with a body count” based on data 
demonstrating increased violence against sex workers of all kinds in the 
months since its passage.194 
Finally, for all of FOSTA’s good intentions, it actually does little to 
help the vast majority of sex-trafficking victims, who do not fit the mold that 
many lawmakers have in mind—a middle-class white female.195 Many 
victims are neither white nor female and may come from low-income 
communities that are overpoliced, resulting in distrust and decreased 
likelihood of cooperation with law enforcement officials.196 These victims 
may fear criminalization or be reluctant to rely on a system that has otherwise 
failed to protect them.197 Because these victims are less likely to report their 
abuse to police, they are hampered in their ability to recover restitution under 
 
 190 Luzwick, supra note 21, at 366–67. 
 191 DeCou, supra note 189, at 435–36; Kaigh, supra note 189, at 160. 
 192 See de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 89–90 (arguing that police have been known to arrest women of 
color, especially transgender women of color, for prostitution rather than arresting their clients). 
 193 Eichert, supra note 29, at 217–26. 
 194 Chamberlain, supra note 29, at 2203. 
 195 See Eichert, supra note 29, at 212–16 (empirically documenting lawmakers’ gendering of sex-
trafficking victims and perpetrators, as well as analyzing lawmakers’ reliance on anecdotal evidence, 
usually “melodramatic, episodic depictions of women and girls, typically of Caucasian descent” being 
sex-trafficked). See generally Claudia Cojocaru, Sex Trafficking, Captivity, and Narrative: Constructing 
Victimhood with the Goal of Salvation, 39 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 183, 191–93 (2015) (arguing 
that the antitrafficking movement has ignored and even harmed victims from marginalized communities 
by focusing on stereotypical notions of victimhood and erasing the autonomy of both victims and 
consensual sex workers). 
 196 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; Cojocaru, supra note 195, at 192; see also 
GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 129 (describing how people of color in the United States frequently have 
more negative contact with police); Eichert, supra note 29, at 236, 243–44 (emphasizing FOSTA’s impact 
on men and the need for more research on its effects on genderqueer and nonbinary individuals).  
 197 See Cojocaru, supra note 195, at 189–93 (describing her experience as a sex-crime victim who 
distrusted antitrafficking activists); de la Cruz, supra note 88, at 90–91 (describing the punitive treatment 
of women of color and transgender women by police). 
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FOSTA, which emphasizes the role of law enforcement.198 Further, many 
trafficking survivors lack the means to pursue civil litigation against internet 
service providers in the way FOSTA contemplates.199 Even if they do sue, 
there is still no guarantee that victims will prevail; FOSTA’s drafters 
indicated that these provisions might apply to only a few providers.200 If 
FOSTA really is interpreted that narrowly, then it is unclear whether it will 
really benefit survivors who are able to litigate any more than prior laws 
did.201  
Perhaps more cynically, as commentators like Professor A.F. Levy have 
suggested, lawmakers’ focus on internet service providers’ role in trafficking 
may be mere “pageantry” intended to placate feminists and antitrafficking 
activists while achieving no real reform.202 FOSTA was passed immediately 
after the highly publicized Backpage investigation and shutdown.203 This 
swift reaction could indicate genuine concern, but it could also be the result 
of purely political motivations.204 Moreover, Backpage’s founders were 
indicted for violating the Travel Act, a preexisting anti-prostitution law, and 
a law criminalizing money laundering—these laws existed before FOSTA 
and remain in effect.205 Thus, FOSTA is little more than a paper tiger in the 
supposed war on online sex trafficking.206 
 
 198 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 7 (2018) (revenues collected through FOSTA claims will be 
used to contribute to the Crime Victim’s Fund, through which FOSTA survivors can obtain restitution 
like other victims of federal crimes). 
 199 Grant, supra note 15. 
 200 See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, supra note 198, at pt.1, at 7 (noting that FOSTA will likely only 
apply to a few offenders). 
 201 See id.; see also J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015) 
(holding that a sex-trafficking survivor could state a claim against Backpage not barred by § 230). 
 202 A.F. Levy, The Virtues of Unvirtuous Spaces, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 422 (2017) (“The 
war on Internet platforms is pageantry: a kind of theater designed to satisfy people’s need to identify and 
fight bad guys without regard to nuance or long-term outcome.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Timothy Williams, U.S. Seizes Backpage.com, a Site Accused of 
Enabling Prostitution, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/us/politics/ 
backpage-prostitution-classified.html [https://perma.cc/AR2V-P5Z8].  
 204 See Levy, supra note 202, at 422 (describing Congress’s efforts to target internet service providers 
to end online sex trafficking as “a kind of theater designed to satisfy people’s need to identify and fight 
bad guys without regard to nuance or long-term outcome”). 
 205 See Indictment at 1, United States v. Lacey, No. 2:18-cr-00422-SPL (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 206 See Glenn Kessler, Has the Sex-Trafficking Law Eliminated 90 Percent of Sex-Trafficking Ads?, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/20/has-sex-
trafficking-law-eliminated-percent-sex-trafficking-ads [https://perma.cc/J8B8-DPW9] (fact-checking 
claims that FOSTA has seriously curtailed sex trafficking by pointing to the lack of data supporting this 
assertion as ads dropped after Backpage was shut down, but before the passage of FOSTA, and the volume 
has since been increasing). 
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Overall, FOSTA, like other legislation that seeks to promote goals 
associated with the feminist movement—such as ending violence against and 
exploitation of women and other marginalized groups—has failed to serve 
many of its intended beneficiaries. Instead, it emphasized punishing 
perpetrators, leaving already vulnerable groups caught in the crossfire. Given 
these numerous arguments against FOSTA, it is unsurprising that the law is 
already facing legal challenges. Still, laws are not invalidated merely for 
being ineffective or unwise. FOSTA’s challengers must marshal their best 
arguments against FOSTA’s constitutionality. The argument that most 
commentators and critics have latched onto is that FOSTA, like some of the 
protective speech restrictions that came before it,207 violates the First 
Amendment. 
C. The First Amendment Case Against FOSTA 
Just two months after FOSTA became law, it was challenged on First 
Amendment grounds. This Section analyzes the ongoing First Amendment 
case against FOSTA and the arguments that could invalidate it, concluding 
that courts should find FOSTA unconstitutional. 
1. Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. United States: Procedural 
Hurdles to Victory 
On June 28, 2018, the Woodhull Freedom Foundation208 and several 
other individuals and groups sued to declare FOSTA unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment and to enjoin its enforcement.209 In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs stressed FOSTA’s chilling effect on political, sex-related speech 
and the need to protect the internet from speech regulations due to its role as 
“an indispensable place to exchange ideas.”210 
The Woodhull Freedom Foundation, for example, advertises online its 
annual conference on decriminalizing sex work;211 Woodhull fears that these 
advertisements may lead to liability under FOSTA’s broad provisions which 
prohibit advertisements that promote and facilitate prostitution.212 Another 
plaintiff, Alex Andrews, advocates for sex workers’ health and welfare.213 
She believes that FOSTA’s vague provisions may target her work online, 
 
 207 See supra Section I.C. 
 208 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 61–63 (describing the Woodhull Freedom Foundation, a group 
that promotes sexual freedom, particularly free sexual speech, and its political activities).  
 209 Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 210 Id. ¶¶ 2–6, 9. 
 211 Id. ¶¶ 61–62, 66. 
 212 Id. ¶ 64. 
 213 Id. ¶¶ 102–03. 
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which aims to help people involved in sex work find free services for health, 
educational, and other needs.214 Yet another plaintiff, Eric Koszyk, is a 
certified massage therapist who has historically advertised online; the main 
site he relied on, Craigslist, banned his advertisements in response to 
FOSTA.215 
These plaintiffs allege that FOSTA is overbroad, reaching far too much 
constitutionally protected speech.216 Further, because FOSTA aims to 
regulate a specific type of speech—speech promoting commercial sex—the 
plaintiffs contend that it is a viewpoint-discriminatory, content-based 
restriction on speech.217 As such, FOSTA is not narrowly tailored enough to 
survive the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny test for content-discriminatory 
speech restrictions.218 
The plaintiffs went to federal district court and were promptly thrown 
out for lack of standing. The court found their allegations of the Act’s breadth 
unpersuasive,219 specifically finding it unlikely that FOSTA could actually 
reach their conduct, thus meaning they faced no imminent injury.220 Absent 
any injury caused by the statute, the plaintiffs had no standing to sue.221 
Additionally, in one pointed footnote, the court called out Alex Andrews’s 
previous criminal record for participating in sex work. The court seemed to 
suggest that if she was afraid of FOSTA, maybe it was because she was still 
working in the sex trade and not because of her advocacy efforts.222 
 
 214 Id. ¶¶ 105–12. 
 215 Id. ¶¶ 93–97. 
 216 Id. ¶¶ 127–34. 
 217 Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 114 (describing plaintiffs’ various concerns over FOSTA’s targeting of pro-sex-work 
views); id. ¶ 4 (arguing that “FOSTA’s prohibitions are entirely content-based” speech restrictions).  
 218 Id. ¶¶ 141–44 (arguing that such regulations are presumptively invalid and that the law fails strict 
scrutiny because it “does not directly advance the government’s objective”). The plaintiffs also alleged 
that FOSTA is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment because it is unlawfully vague and it applies 
retroactively in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 149–52, 
169. 
 219 Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 196–204 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d, 
948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 370 
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing the district court opinion). 
 220 Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 198–204 (finding § 2421A was “plainly calculated 
to ensnare only specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular individual, not the broad subject-matter 
of prostitution”); see also Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d. at 370. 
 221 Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 201–03; see also Woodhull Freedom Found., 
948 F.3d. at 370. 
 222 Woodhull Freedom Found., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 193, 194 n.8 (describing Alex Andrews—also 
known as Jesse Maley—and her history with prostitution charges despite the fact that those charges were 
not at issue). 
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The plaintiffs appealed, and the D.C. Circuit proved more sympathetic, 
reasoning that the statute could reasonably reach the plaintiffs’ online 
speech.223 It specifically noted that Andrews’s advocacy likely did fall within 
the vagaries of FOSTA’s prohibition on promoting prostitution and that 
Koszyk’s financial injury after Craigslist banned his ads was sufficiently 
linked to FOSTA.224 It therefore remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings on the merits.225 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion arrived in 
January 2020, meaning that the challenge to FOSTA’s merits has not yet 
been fully developed. Below, this Note explores some of the arguments that 
should be made against FOSTA and its dangers to free speech. 
2. FOSTA’s First Amendment Implications 
The plaintiffs argue that FOSTA runs afoul of the First Amendment in 
two ways. First, its provisions include a substantial amount of protected 
speech, rendering it facially overbroad.226 Second, since it contains content-
based restrictions—specifically viewpoint discrimination—it fails a strict 
scrutiny analysis.227 As explained below, both arguments have merit. 
Furthermore, despite the government’s protestations, neither the criminality 
and incitement exception nor the obscenity exception should shield FOSTA 
from invalidation. 
To begin, FOSTA’s sweep may indeed be overbroad as it includes a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.  FOSTA proscribes 
promoting or facilitating prostitution but fails to explain what online speech 
qualifies under either category.228 This opens FOSTA up to restricting far 
more than only sex-trafficking advertisements, which, while numerous, were 
far from the only sex-adjacent content on websites like Backpage or 
Craigslist.229 For example, a court could consider speech that seeks to 
improve the health and welfare of sex workers as constituting promotion or 
facilitation of prostitution. This speech enables sex workers to engage in 
 
 223 Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 371–74 (finding that the plaintiffs had standing). 
 224 See id. at 373 (finding “ample reason to conclude that the threat of future enforcement against 
Andrews is substantial”); id. at 374 (noting that FOSTA led to the “drying up” of Koszyk’s stream of 
clients). 
 225 See id. at 374. The D.C. Circuit noted that because all of the remaining plaintiffs had substantially 
similar claims, there was no need to evaluate their standing individually. See id. at 371. 
 226 Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 127–34. 
 227 See id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 114 (arguing FOSTA discriminates against pro-sex-work views expressed online). 
 228 See FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, sec. 3, § 2421A, 132 Stat. 1253, 1253–54 (2018). 
 229 See McCombs, supra note 17 (discussing Backpage’s predominant use for voluntary sex 
workers); see also Levy, supra note 202, at 408–10, 410 n.38 (arguing that increases in online 
advertisements for voluntary prostitution do not necessarily indicate a proportionate preponderance of 
sex trafficking). 
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commercial sex by helping them access free services, without which they 
might be unable to work or even survive. Additionally, speech that advocates 
decriminalizing all sex work could technically be considered “promoting” 
prostitution by literally promoting its legalization.230 
In this way, FOSTA’s apparent overbreadth chills the legitimate 
advocacy and discussion of sex work, which remain protected under the First 
Amendment.231 FOSTA does have an affirmative defense that allows 
speakers to claim safe harbor if their speech is directed at a jurisdiction where 
prostitution is legal, such as several counties in Nevada.232 Nevertheless, 
even if they invoke this clause as a defense, potential defendants will already 
have suffered repercussions for their speech by being threatened with 
prosecution.233 The threat of criminal prosecution, regardless of ultimate 
liability, likely suffices to give users and providers pause, therefore chilling 
legal speech. More to the point, most United States jurisdictions have not 
legalized prostitution, and that is where the bulk of decriminalization 
advocacy is likely to occur. 
Moreover, even if the Government promises not to enforce FOSTA to 
its full breadth, this similarly fails to cure its deficiencies; such promises are 
matters of executive discretion and do not bind future administrations.234 And 
promises of enforcement do nothing to ameliorate the actual text of the 
statute, which is what is at issue here.235 Thus, no matter what the government 
says it will do, with FOSTA still on the books, plaintiffs continue to feel the 
law’s chilling effect. FOSTA’s inclusion of a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected speech should therefore render it invalid for 
overbreadth under the First Amendment. 
 
 230 See Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 372–73 (noting that FOSTA’s prohibitions on 
promoting or facilitating prostitution could plausibly include advocacy and speech of the sort the plaintiffs 
carry out). 
 231 See Chamberlain, supra note 29, at 2196–2200 (arguing that FOSTA is likely unconstitutional 
due to its plausible inclusion of all speech that makes sex work easier to engage in, which could reach 
harm reduction, advocacy, and decriminalization efforts like those of the plaintiffs in Woodhull).   
 232 FOSTA, sec. 3, § 2421A(e); see also Prostitution and Sex Work, supra note 14, at 567–68 
(prostitution is completely legal within seven counties in Nevada and may be permitted in certain areas 
of six other counties). 
 233 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 476, 481–82 (2010) (finding that a safe harbor 
provision pertaining to conduct lawful in some jurisdictions but unlawful in others did not sufficiently 
narrow the scope of an unlawful speech regulation). 
 234 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“[T]he Government retains broad 
discretion as to whom to prosecute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 235 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 480–81 (noting that promising not to enforce a law against specific 
persons or forms of conduct does not cure its overbreadth based on its actual text). 
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FOSTA is also a content-based restriction on speech. Content-based 
restrictions—particularly those that discriminate against specific 
viewpoints—are presumptively invalid and evaluated under strict scrutiny.236 
In FOSTA’s case, the government certainly has a compelling interest in 
preventing sex trafficking, which is, of course, illegal throughout the United 
States.237 The question is whether FOSTA’s restrictions are sufficiently 
narrowly tailored in relation to its compelling interest, and the answer is that 
they are not.  
First, FOSTA regulates internet speech, which has historically been 
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection.238 The Court has time and 
again noted the importance of the internet for disseminating and engaging 
with new information and ideas and has been reluctant to allow regulation of 
this increasingly important medium of communication and education.239 
Second, and critically, FOSTA specifically discriminates against a specific 
viewpoint: the promotion of prostitution.240 Although prostitution is mostly 
illegal in the United States, it is not illegal to campaign for its 
decriminalization or even expound its positive attributes. FOSTA, therefore, 
constitutes unlawful viewpoint discrimination insofar as it prohibits speech 
promoting pro-prostitution and pro-sex-work views.241 Indeed, under the 
pornography cases,242 Congress cannot even prohibit pro-trafficking, pro-
abuse, or pro-rape views, as reprehensible as most find them to be.243 
FOSTA’s discriminatory prohibitions therefore seem unlikely to survive 
under prevailing precedent. 
 
 236 Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 692 (“Laws that 
suppress speech on the basis of content are subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny, which is often 
outcome determinative.”); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–
30 (1995) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible . . . .”). 
 237 See Ronald Weitzer, Sex Trafficking and the Sex Industry: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory 
and Legislation, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337, 1337 (2012) (describing and defining U.S. law 
prohibiting sex trafficking).  
 238 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867–70 (1997). The Court has found that some forms of media 
(such as television and radio broadcasts) may be subject to more regulation because of their nature, which 
allows immediate exposure to possibly harmful material simply by turning a television or radio on. In 
contrast, the internet more often requires users to take active steps to find any material—harmful or 
otherwise—and so may be subject to fewer regulations. See id. at 867. 
 239 See id. at 850–53, 863. 
 240 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding an anti-pornography 
ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to its viewpoint discrimination against 
pornography viewers and people with degrading views of women), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 241 See id. 
 242 See supra Section I.C. 
 243 See Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 771 F.2d at 330. 
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FOSTA’s supporters might suggest that its restrictions are permissible 
under the First Amendment exceptions for speech integral to criminal 
conduct and incitement because posting “advertisements” aids in unlawful 
commercial sex transactions. But these First Amendment exceptions are 
narrow. If FOSTA’s provisions go beyond speech that is intertwined with 
unlawful commercial sex transactions or likely to incite imminent criminal 
conduct, then it is not narrowly tailored.244 Here, FOSTA’s prohibition on 
promoting prostitution exceeds the narrow limits of either exception. Unlike 
prohibitions on possessing, selling, or purchasing child pornography, for 
example, “promotion” can include political advocacy and abstract speech 
regarding the morality of prostitution.245 Likewise, FOSTA’s provisions fall 
far outside the narrow limits of obscenity.246 If statutes that are modeled after 
the Supreme Court’s own obscenity test are not narrow enough for the 
obscenity exception,247 then neither is FOSTA, which does not explicitly 
cabin its reach. 
Overall, the plaintiffs have strong arguments for FOSTA’s 
unconstitutionality. These arguments seem even sturdier in light of precedent 
invalidating attempts to restrict speech based on its content, particularly on 
the internet.248 Of course, much litigation is still to come, and the plaintiffs 
could ultimately lose. Prostitution remains illegal in all but a few counties in 
Nevada and other forms of sex work remain stigmatized, and these elements 
could color a court’s analysis. Sentiments of this stigma rang true in the 
district court’s opinion dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, where it dug into 
one plaintiff’s sex-worker past, despite its irrelevance to the case at hand.249 
Likewise, scholars have noted that a law’s important or admirable goals may 
likewise influence a court’s analysis;250 FOSTA’s noble goal of combating 
sex trafficking may thus be similarly influential, leading a court to take a 
more generous view of the Act. As such, FOSTA’s fate remains uncertain; 
 
 244 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 245 Compare United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298–99 (2008) (upholding laws prohibiting 
selling or soliciting child pornography), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) 
(advocacy for the morality of a criminal act cannot be restricted under the First Amendment). 
 246 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873–74 (1997). 
 247 See id. 
 248 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 464–70 (2010) (invalidating a law targeting “crush 
videos” on the internet); Reno, 521 U.S. at 863, 867 (noting that some forms of communication may 
receive the highest protection). 
 249 See Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 194 n.8 (D.D.C. 2018), 
rev’d, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 250 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 236, at 692–93 (noting that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
decisions have at times been influenced by a potential balancing of the harms and benefits of a challenged 
law despite its clearly violative nature). 
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invalidating it would accord with First Amendment doctrine, but sustaining 
it would play into a trend of ignoring speech harms to marginalized groups251 
and encouraging “carceral feminis[t]” legislation.252 Only time will tell if 
FOSTA’s flawed provisions will be stricken. As of June 2020, the plaintiffs’ 
case against FOSTA remains pending in the district court. 
III. SOLUTIONS FOR SURVIVORS 
This Note has argued FOSTA is unwise and likely unconstitutional. But 
FOSTA’s flaws do not render its goals irrelevant. As such, this Part 
advocates for adopting alternative reforms that better serve sex-trafficking 
survivors and mitigate FOSTA’s harms to other internet speakers. First, it 
assesses FOSTA through a feminist lens, arguing that FOSTA should focus 
on improving the lives of sex-trafficking survivors rather than focusing on 
punishment and thereby inadvertently harming sex workers and other 
internet speakers. As a result, this Note proposes a common-fund solution, 
which would benefit more survivors without further endangering voluntary 
sex workers or free speech. 
A. Returning to Feminist Values for Real Reform 
As discussed in Section II.A, FOSTA did not come out of nowhere. 
Like previous laws inspired by feminist factions, FOSTA was the product of 
an unlikely coalition of feminist activists and political conservatives; 
FOSTA passed with little opposition because of its broad coalition of 
support.253 FOSTA combined the early anti-rape movement’s focus on 
punishing perpetrators254 with the anti-pornography movement’s content-
based speech restrictions,255 and it targets online speech, which has been 
given heightened protections.256 FOSTA thus creates a perfect storm of 
 
 251 See generally Mary Anne Franks, Witch Hunts: Free Speech, #MeToo, and the Fear of Women’s 
Words, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123 (arguing that while the First Amendment is often used to defend 
repugnant male speech, courts have allowed women to be silenced and censored). 
 252 See Bernstein, supra note 96, at 142–43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253 See Eichert, supra note 29, at 210 (arguing that both conservative politicians and left-wing, radical 
feminists promote similarly restrictive policies that proscribe sexual expression that deviates from either 
group’s limited range of acceptable sexual speech or conduct); cf. Bernstein, supra note 96, at 143 
(characterizing the anti-sex-trafficking movement behind the TVPRA as a collaboration between 
“devoted evangelical and feminist antitrafficking activists and neoconservative Washington think tanks”). 
 254 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 125. 
 255 See Willis, supra note 100, at 351–52, 356–57. Though the anti-pornography ordinances were 
ultimately unsuccessful, they did gain some initial traction. See supra Section I.C. 
 256 See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
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punitive speech restrictions. As a result, it leaves sex-trafficking survivors 
and other internet speakers out to dry. 
One likely counterargument to this Note is that many (if not all) of those 
affected by FOSTA’s speech restrictions are engaging in or supporting 
unlawful sex work. Although not all forms of sex work are currently 
criminalized,257 prostitution is, and prostitution is what FOSTA targets. So 
why should “law-abiding” Americans care? To begin, as Lucy Khan writes 
in her essay on FOSTA’s impact on sex workers and society, FOSTA’s broad 
prohibitions on internet speech set a dangerous precedent.258 Although 
FOSTA itself only deals with speech related to commercial sex, it has 
already affected nonsex workers who advertise online.259 
As such, if FOSTA remains in place, it could become precedent for 
future content-restrictive laws. At a time when Americans increasingly 
distrust government,260 allowing lawmakers to control the proliferation of 
internet speech seems dubious at best. The internet has become the ultimate 
“marketplace of ideas,” a marketplace that free speech scholars have called 
essential for the exchange of ideas and knowledge.261 This has its 
drawbacks—some scholars have already critiqued failures to regulate 
harassment online, which in turn drives women, people of color, and LGBTQ 
people offline262—but it is not clear that the answer to this should be top-
down federal intervention as opposed to bottom-up cultural reforms. This is 
 
 257 The terms “sex work” and “the sex work industry” generally refer to and encompass various 
commercial sex-related acts, many of which are not prohibited by prostitution laws. See Prostitution and 
Sex Work, supra note 14, at 553–54.  
 258 See Khan, supra note †. Additionally, if FOSTA reaches the kind of political speech critics 
believe, it offends even those scholars who disagree with the Court’s all-inclusive approach to the First 
Amendment. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
255 (arguing that the First Amendment’s central concern is not the power to speak, but “the freedom of 
those activities of thought and communication by which we ‘govern’”). 
 259 See Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 93–97 (describing FOSTA’s impact on massage therapist Eric 
Koszyk’s livelihood). 
 260 See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, D. Alex Winkelman, Kelly Bergstrand & Darren Modzelewski, 
The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 375, 376 (2016) (describing increasing public distrust of government officials). 
 261 See Meiklejohn, supra note 258 (arguing that the First Amendment’s protections are essential for 
maintaining a democratic system). 
 262 See Mary Anne Franks & Ari Ezra Waldman, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and Free 
Speech Delusions, 78 MD. L. REV. 892, 892–93, 896 (2019) (arguing that expansive free-speech rights 
have been weaponized against “women, queer people, persons of color, and other racial and ethnic 
minorities”). 
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especially true given that top-down “thought control” measures have been 
largely repudiated.263 
Furthermore, even if one is not compelled by the free-speech 
perspective,264 there are other normative concerns that direct reformers away 
from laws that harm sex workers. Feminists are split on the ethics of sex 
work, just as they are split on pornography.265 Some, like Professor 
MacKinnon, argue that all commercial sex subordinates women as a class.266 
Relatedly, Professor Cheryl Nelson Butler has suggested that many sex 
workers, especially women of color, were effectively coerced into the trade 
due to lack of economic and educational opportunities.267 But these 
approaches are not universal. Others, such as Professor I. India Thusi, argue 
that feminist scholars opposing sex work often fail to actually account for 
the perspectives of the sex workers themselves.268 She argues that feminists 
who seek to improve the welfare of all women and marginalized people 
should listen to these often-marginalized people as well, even if they disagree 
with feminists’ contentions about the exploitative nature of sex work.269 
Despite their varying views on sex work, these scholars agree that 
current laws that focus on criminalizing conduct related to commercial sex 
harm more than they help.270 Professor MacKinnon highlights that 
prostitution laws are enforced against “sellers” of sex, typically women, far 
more often than they are enforced against “buyers,” who are typically men.271 
Professor Butler likewise highlights the problems with criminalizing sex 
work for women of color in particular, who are already disproportionately 
 
 263 See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327–28 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986). 
 264 See e.g., Torrey, supra note 123, at 26–31 (describing how courts have used the First Amendment 
to justify allowing women to suffer harms in order to avoid speech harms to society at large, particularly 
men). 
 265 See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 532–42 
(2000) (describing feminist agreements and disagreements on commercial sex). 
 266 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 20 
(1993). 
 267 Cheryl Nelson Butler, A Critical Race Feminist Perspective on Prostitution & Sex Trafficking in 
America, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 95, 101–02, 135 (2015). 
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targeted and mistreated by law enforcement.272 And Professor Thusi 
advocates for a position on sex work that actively accounts for the views and 
experiences of sex workers themselves, who largely oppose 
criminalization.273 
The dangers that these scholars highlight apply to those who choose to 
engage in sex work as well as to those who are coerced—including sex-
trafficking survivors. As such, there is feminist consensus that U.S. law’s 
current emphasis on punishing sex workers is no solution at all. 
Feminist consensus on the need to mitigate harms to women and other 
marginalized people demonstrates the need to reform FOSTA. Although 
FOSTA does not specifically target sex workers—like other prostitution 
laws—it has a net-negative effect on vulnerable and marginalized groups.274 
FOSTA was meant to punish powerful internet service providers.275 But in 
reality, FOSTA harms voluntary sex workers and, alongside them, sex-
trafficking victims. Additionally, law enforcement is having an even harder 
time apprehending actual traffickers than they did when traffickers were able 
to post on Backpage.276 Meanwhile, survivors are not able to reap FOSTA’s 
promised benefits due to its failure to account for victims who cannot litigate 
or rely on law enforcement. Feminist ideals—and First Amendment law—
call for a new solution that serves FOSTA’s intended beneficiaries without 
causing undue harm to others. 
B. Proposing a Common Fund 
As scholars such as Professor Gottschalk have noted, one of the key 
factors that drove feminists to support punitive reforms, as opposed to 
comprehensive support for victims of domestic violence, was the United 
States’ lack of social safety nets.277 Increasing social supports for everyone 
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eBay as targets for FOSTA’s provisions). 
 276 See Grant, supra note 15; Fischer, supra note 188. 
 277 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 85, at 116, 122–24, 126–29 (noting that existing institutional and 
ideological frameworks in the United States prompted anti-rape activists to work with government to 
provide special support systems for rape victims because of the impact of a lack of social safety nets). 
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would provide the greatest benefit to the largest number of people—
including those particularly at risk for being drawn into sex trafficking and 
other coerced sex work.278 Making benefits widely available would help 
solve FOSTA’s failure to support survivors, as survivors would no longer 
need to become involved with law enforcement to obtain restitution or find 
the funds to litigate against internet service providers. But such a solution 
seems unlikely to occur anytime soon. The United States remains unlikely to 
increase financial assistance to residents, as public opinion and politicians 
have often tended against broadening social supports, with many Americans 
believing that their fellow citizens already expect too much from 
government.279 
As such, this Note proposes the creation of a special common fund for 
sex-trafficking survivors. Common funds allow a large group of similarly 
situated individuals to obtain recovery for the harms they have suffered.280 
Although common funds are usually established for class action plaintiffs, 
they can also be established by legislation.281 For example, following the 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Congress 
established a common fund from which victims of the attacks or their 
families could obtain financial relief.282 The common fund helped streamline 
the claim and recovery process for those affected, and helped shield airlines 
from countless negligence suits which could have harmed the industry.283 
Congress could establish a similar type of fund for sex-trafficking 
survivors to obtain financial relief as an alternative to FOSTA’s civil and 
criminal claims. Such a fund could streamline the recovery process by 
utilizing the existing networks of advocacy organizations that provide 
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services to sex-trafficking survivors and encouraging these advocates to help 
survivors participate in the claim and recovery process. Notably, these 
advocates, who have significant experience working with and getting 
resources to survivors, are less likely to perpetuate the kind of stigma and 
stereotypes about people involved in the sex trade that disincentivize 
survivors from coming forward to law enforcement officials.284 The recovery 
process could, like the 9/11 fund, utilize a simple website format, which 
allows the direct submission of claims by victims and their families and 
provide links to these advocacy groups that could help survivors submit their 
claims successfully.285 
A common fund would therefore remedy the central weaknesses of 
FOSTA. First, it contains no speech restrictions, meaning it does not 
implicate the First Amendment whatsoever. And there are critical practical 
benefits too. For one thing, FOSTA assumes that survivors can litigate their 
claims against exploitative online service providers. Litigation, however, is 
expensive and time-consuming, and survivors who are unable to litigate may 
be in especially dire need of financial resources and other forms of support. 
FOSTA’s restitution provisions also require cooperation with law 
enforcement, which some survivors may be reluctant to do.286 In contrast, the 
proposed common fund could be created such that it totally avoids the need 
for litigation or contact with law enforcement to obtain compensation. 
Another troubling aspect of FOSTA is that, for many survivors, it 
comes too late. Although the exact number of sex-trafficking victims is hard 
to quantify,287 scholars estimate that hundreds of trafficking victims have 
been exploited through online advertisements while § 230 provided blanket 
immunity to online service providers.288 With the passage of time, evidence 
may be lost and memories of witnesses faded, making it that much harder 
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for these survivors to attempt to recover under FOSTA’s litigation 
provisions. For many of these survivors, FOSTA may not just be justice 
delayed, but justice denied.  
On the other hand, the creation of a common fund, from which any sex-
trafficking survivor could obtain at least some financial relief, would help 
victims of past crimes obtain the support they need. The 9/11 fund, of course, 
pertains to the specific time period of the attacks; nonetheless, victims and 
family members remain able to submit claims.289 A recent reauthorization of 
the fund extended the deadline for filing claims to October 2090.290 A 
common fund for sex-trafficking survivors could cover a smaller timeframe, 
such as from 2000 (when human trafficking was officially recognized under 
federal law)291 to 2030, and still provide significant relief to many survivors 
who may not be able to bring a civil or criminal case. Moreover, a common-
fund recovery process would not require the same level of proof as a criminal 
or even a civil trial,292 and although the survivor’s compensation might be 
smaller than with a lawsuit, it would be less expensive and time-consuming 
to pursue, just as with the 9/11 fund.293 
One might argue that a common fund is unreasonable because of the 
problem of finding sufficient funds. However, Congress need not necessarily 
even dedicate new funds to this project. Rather, Congress could utilize the 
government’s ongoing case against Backpage’s founders to obtain the 
requisite finances. Congress identified Backpage as a “market leader” with 
tremendous assets; prior to being seized in the spring of 2018, Backpage was 
valued at more than $500 million and collected over 80% of all revenue 
generated by the online sex trade in the United States.294 Federal prosecutors 
are currently trying to seize the assets of Backpage’s former owners in the 
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ongoing case against them,295 and FOSTA already provides for asset 
appropriation and redistribution in accordance with existing restitution 
law.296 This Note only proposes modifying this scheme to make it easier for 
survivors to access funds through a direct request to the fund rather than 
going through law enforcement channels. 
On the other hand, this asset-forfeiture mechanism might still play into 
the pitfalls of punitiveness297 or possibly present its own constitutional 
concerns.298 Alternatively, implementing a shared payment scheme among 
online service providers provides a less punitive option. Like other forms of 
risk-sharing, such as workers’ compensation,299 online service providers 
could buy into a risk-sharing pool by paying into the common fund. These 
funds could then be allocated to claimants injured by being advertised for 
commercial sex online. 
In essence, a common-fund scheme would prioritize providing benefits 
to victims over attributing blame to online service providers. Just as workers’ 
compensation sought to encourage employers to improve safety conditions 
without increasing litigation, this risk-spreading scheme could encourage 
online service providers to monitor for sex trafficking on their sites while not 
creating as great of an incentive to unduly censor all sex- or sex-work-related 
content because there would be no unexpected, expensive lawsuits.300 Such 
a scheme would not pose as great a chilling effect on internet speech as 
FOSTA’s current language, but would still provide benefits to victims and 
promote good-faith monitoring as § 230 originally promised.301 Furthermore, 
focusing on benefits over blame addresses feminist scholars’ concerns with 
current anti-prostitution laws, thus helping survivors without harming 
voluntary sex workers.302 
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In this way, establishing a common fund would allow sex-trafficking 
survivors to recover compensation without contravening the First 
Amendment. Further, by existing outside of the very expensive and time-
consuming litigation framework, a common fund allows recovery for all 
survivors, not just those with the means to litigate or the privilege to 
cooperate with law enforcement without being treated as a criminal.303 
Although a common fund would not end online sex trafficking, neither has 
FOSTA. Recent data indicate it has merely driven traffickers underground 
or to harder-to-find platforms rather than out of existence.304 At the very least, 
a common fund would provide benefits for a greater number of survivors 
with lower costs to them and with less risk of endangering voluntary sex 
workers, advocates, or any other internet speakers. 
CONCLUSION 
FOSTA’s fate remains uncertain. A growing number of scholars and 
commentators have called for its repeal or invalidation, and the D.C. Circuit 
gave the go-ahead for just that result. But FOSTA’s demise would not end 
the project of supporting sex-trafficking survivors. Indeed, FOSTA’s 
invalidation or repeal presents a new opportunity to enact meaningful reform 
tailored to the needs of survivors. Although the idea of punishing bad actors 
appeals to many, FOSTA’s form of punishment endangers not only online 
service providers that profit from commercial sex, but also free internet 
speech, consensual sex workers, and even sex-trafficking victims 
themselves. Because FOSTA infringes on the First Amendment, incentivizes 
websites to censor consensual sex workers and advocates, and does not 
adequately aid sex-trafficking survivors, Congress should enact a solution to 
address all of these concerns. A common fund does just that. 
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